FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

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We can also observe, in the three graphs above, that the behavior of our dependent variable (annual percentage change in the perceived frequencies of corruption per sampled court) goes through a significant decrease beginning in 1994-96, the period when, in accordance with the explanation given above, the aforementioned organizational, procedural, and substantive reforms reduced the capacity of the Argentine, Venezuelan and Ecuadorian court officials to extract illicit rents from users. We can also observe from the length of each of the boxes, that the pilot courts also show a decrease in the spread or standard deviation of the frequencies of perceived corruption. This decrease in the standard deviation signals an improvement in the predictability and expected integrity in the judicial environment in each of the countries. TABLE 2 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: AVERAGE PERCEIVED FREQUENCY OF CORRUPTION VENEZUELA ECUADOR ARGENTINA VARIABLE ADJ R-SQUARE= 0.510 ADJ R-SQUARE = 0.493 ADJ R- SQUARE = 0.411 OLS P OLS P OLS P ORGROLE 0.249 0.00 2.961 0.01 0.235 0.07 PROCTIME 0.991 0.00 0.771 0.02 0.671 0.04 NUMPROC 0.295 0.01 4.903 0.00 2.993 0.04 COMPUTER -2.683 -0.02 -0.651 -0.03 -1.293 -0.11 REPORT 0.917 0.01 1.233 0.00 184
0.192 0.00 REAL INCOME -0.810 -0.58 4.006 0.13 -0.810 -0.45 ADR -2.001 -0.00 -3.910 -0.00 -6.935 -0.08 Table 2 contains the OLS regression results for the year to year changes in the perceived frequencies of corruption. Note that the adjusted R squares are quite reasonable for models of this type (0.51 for Venezuela, 0.493 for Ecuador, and 0.411 for Argentina). The results were tested for multicollinearity and met the basic required assumptions in for these types of models. An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in the Courts 18 The results of the regression analysis in the three countries are consistent and the coefficients are significant and show the expected signs, with the exception of REAL INCOME (average real compensation computed in terms of the basic basket of goods and services). Our OLS model in Table 2 shows that a an increase in ORGROLE index, measuring the proportion of all administrative and adjudiciational tasks allocated to court personnel (i.e. judge, law clerk, and administrative personnel) in an informal and unpredictable manner, causes increases in the yearly changes in the frequencies of corruption per court in Venezuela, in Ecuador, and, in a less significant manner, in Argentina. We can also observe that larger variations in procedural times to disposition (PROCTIME), that occur above the code-specified deadline, do also cause significant increases in the perceived frequencies of corruption in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela. This confirms many reports of “speed money-related corruption”. It is common knowledge among litigators that procedural times are used as a strategic tool by court employees to extract larger illicit rents from court users. Our findings tend to confirm these views. Moreover, we observe from Table 2 that an increase in the number of administrative and procedural steps followed in each of the sampled commercial cases (NUMPROC), also comes with significant increases in the frequencies of perceived corruption in Argentina, Ecuador, and in Venezuela. In all cases, the coefficients show significance at a 1 or 5 percent levels. This adds credence to the claim that unjustified procedural complexity is usually associated to corrupt practices. On the other hand, as stated above, information technology performing the following six functions also has a significant impact on the perceived frequencies of corruption. Information technology includes (i) the use of a jurisprudence/legal data base online; (ii) accessible backlog/court statistics online; (iii) case-tracking and monitoring system; (iv) word processing used to draft rulings; (v) the online accounting of budget transactions and financial cash flows monitored by external auditors and the judicial councils including the existence of a computer network containing professional and financial information about each employee; and (vi) the presence of computer terminals to be used by court users who choose to report 185 Page 23
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FILSAFAT KORUPSI Kata "korupsi" dat
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o 2.1 Five Hypotheses Concerning th
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justified by recourse to some princ
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We can conclude that the various cu
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pribadi tidak kelembagaan] Korupsi
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er;ubah, [bukan/tidak] hakim, maupu
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suatu courtroom [yang] menentukan d
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pelatihan dewan pejabat pemberlaku
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and compromised in a corrupt and in
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corruptor (as we have defined corru
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to, a large corporation who steal f
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including the moral characters of t
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disibukkan dengan suatu tindakan ko
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penawaran dengan demikian digangsir
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corruption — although it might se
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yang ia percaya untuk;menjadi [hak/
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Abed, George T. and Sanjeev Gupta (
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case they would occasionally make e
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analogies lead to bad conclusions,
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Ini adalah tembolok Google' untuk h
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Indicates the frequency of attempts
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Population Public officials . Not e
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4. Corruption expectations Populati
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. that it is a successful practice
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as corruption within international
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wrath is seen as directed at our ow
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Publisher: Prentice Hall Copyright:
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studies, for example, Watergate. In
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Corruption is widely recognised to
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Developing Cultural Criminology: Th
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Paradigms of Power & Persuasion, 1-
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phenomenon, is it not plausible tha
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Definition of Institutional Corrupt
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The third and final thesis to be di
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A final point about social groups.
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espect of the moral weight to be at
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institutional actor in this setting
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elationship can be overcome or even
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Related research VI Page 1 The Role
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esources are embezzled from the sec
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sentiments and when the rule of sys
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Publishing Press, Bucharest 1994 (I
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monitor it) and in a context in whi
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5 capital have received considerabl
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Page 7 7 A first is reputation-base
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trustworthiness. Trustworthy behavi
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trustworthiness. However, B‘s beh
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that children feel as a result of p
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Page 16 16 belief that others are a
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18 may demand payoffs in return for
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Firms pay bribes to obtain certaint
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conflicts of interest have not been
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of social capital (Putnam, 2000). P
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such activities, the government sup
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countries in the region. 32 29 More
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Communist countries (Inglehart and
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113 gov-ernment, and tests the hypo
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115 Page 6 the data, and empiricall
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tion nets the defector a maximum on
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viduals having a direct “trade”
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R 2 − c + K(u + z) + δ 1 − δ
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in internal disputes. 9 These examp
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Indian politicians often intervene
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Propositions 1 and 2 showed how soc
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are members of different networks,
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In India, as we have seen, transfer
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Page 145 and 146: eform and industrial policy. The su
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Page 151 and 152: children‘s schoolteacher, when yo
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Page 163 and 164: 163 gifts and tributes between loca
Page 165 and 166: 165 corrupt acts in society. Global
Page 167 and 168: 167 bring together the media, polit
Page 169 and 170: Transparency International, Corrupt
Page 171 and 172: Rutland, Peter and Natasha Kogan. C
Page 173 and 174: Courts: a Governance-based Approach
Page 175 and 176: indicators. Yet, it is always possi
Page 177 and 178: (judges, lawyers, and firms). The S
Page 179 and 180: same kind of administrative and pro
Page 181 and 182: at a low expected cost and, therefo
Page 183: Impact of Reforms on the Reports of
Page 187 and 188: community-based institutions in Per
Page 189 and 190: Berikut ini adalah versi HTML dari
Page 191 and 192: 191 2)Even the institutional reform
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Page 195 and 196: 20) PATRICK GLYNN , STEPHEN J. KOBR
Page 197 and 198: connected with a broader sense of f
Page 199 and 200: trade liberalization; (6) liberaliz
Page 201 and 202: president the power to enact decree
Page 203 and 204: that create deprivation face little
Page 205: The debate about the composition of
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