FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI
FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI
FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI
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higher returns to capital and more competition can be detrimental for welfare and growth,<br />
as they induce more rent seeking/corruption. Finally, our paradigm yields insights into<br />
the relationship of R&D, politicoeconomic equilibrium, income distribution, and growth,<br />
as well as the design of tax/growth policies in the presence of rent seeking/corruption.<br />
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with<br />
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Date of creation: May 2000<br />
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