FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI

UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA (University of Notre Dame Press, 1999). On the relation between crime
and inequality see also Roberto Kant de Lima, ―Bureaucratic Rationality in Brazil and in the United States: Criminal
Justice Systems in Comparative Perspective‖, in David J. Hess and Roberto da Matta, The Brazilian Puzzle: Culture
on the Borderlands of the Western World 241-269 (David J. Hess and Roberto da Matta, Eds., Columbia University
Press, 1995).
12) . See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM , LADEMOCRACIA EN AMÉRICA LATINA 137 (UNDP,
2004). Page 9
presidentialism does not imply executive supremacy. Executive supremacy might be considered
a distortion, and the power of the president to legislate by decrees is probably its main deviation.
Many authors have considered such deviation a necessary evil in developing countries because it
would help the government to be more efficient.14). Others have argued that Latin American executive
powers are actually weak, what leads them to appeal to authoritarian and unorthodox means, giving the
impression of ―executive supremacy‖ when what exists is only general institutional fragility.15) This last
view should be complemented by an approach that is more widely accepted: the idea that Latin American
political parties are weak and usually centered in charismatic figures. Party leaders who eventually become
presidents may display extreme power. However, considering that presidents do not have a strong party to
support them, or an institutionalized opposition to negotiate in Congress, reaching endurable political
agreements is almost impossible. 16). There is appearance of power, no real power, because the president
is not able to implement policies based on broad social compacts. In this environment of generalized
institutional weakness, one of the mechanisms which the president might use to implement policies is
corruption. The executive might try to buy political support in Congress distributing positions in the
government, campaign support, privileged information, or under-the-table money. Some authors argued
that such relations have prevailed since the transition from authoritarianism in Latin America, and
corruption has
13). See Arendt Lijphart, D EMOCRACIES : PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN ANDCONSENSUS G
OVERNMENT IN TWENTY –ONE COUNTRIES (Yale University Press, 1984).
14).See Samuel Huntington, P OLITICAL ORDER IN C HANGING S OCIETIES (Yale University Press,
1968).
15). See Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism in Latin America, 25 L ATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH
REVIEW 157, 162 (1990) (―Under democratic conditions, most Latin American presidents have had
trouble accomplishing their agendas. They have held most of the power for initiating policy but have found
it hard to get support for implementing policy. If my analysis is correct, it points to a significant weakness
in democratic presidencies.‖)
16). See Javier Corrales, P RESIDENTS WITHOUT PARTIES :THE POLITICS OF E CONOMIC
REFORM IN MA RGENTINA AND VENEZUELA IN THE 1960 S 13-37 (The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2002).
Page 10
thrived. 17). Again, there are multiple perspectives about this problem. Some corruption theories
would argue that a strong executive is good because it makes corruption centralized, organized,
and predictable. 18). Others would say that the concentration of power in the hands of the president
by itself creates the opportunities for corruption. However, if there are not powerful mechanisms
to oversee parliamentary activity, legislators might also present collusive behavior. In this case,
transferring power from the executive to Congress might do no good to prevent dishonest
behavior. It might, instead, increase levels of corruption. Despite such conflicting views, a general picture
can be drawn. I will assume, first, that both the executive and the legislative powers in Latin America are
weak because of the non-institutionalization of party systems; second, that the personalistic and clientelistic
characteristics of Latin American politics, resulting from its autocratic past, creates a tendency of executive
supremacy; and, third, that such concentration of power in the hands of the executive might
increase corruption and have distributional consequences, such as excluding disenfranchised
groups from political debate. Considering such assumptions, my argument is that reforms which
seek to transfer legislative authority from the executive to Congress and to strengthen political
parties would reduce the perception of corruption and would contribute to reduce economic
inequality only if articulated with policies to empower disenfranchised groups.
193