FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI
FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI
FILSAFAT KORUPSI - Direktori File UPI
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In India, as we have seen, transfers are the usual way of disciplining<br />
officials. So, if social integration, or something like it, somehow reduces<br />
corruption, then this gives us yet another reason why social integration<br />
might be negatively correlated with transfer frequency. The main point,<br />
however, is simply that a variety of reasonable theories might predict<br />
that social integration would be negatively correlated with transfer fre-<br />
quency, and that this contrasts with the prediction we have made based<br />
on our model above.<br />
Based on this discrepancy, section 7 will attempt to empirically eval-<br />
uate the relevance of these alternative possible explanations for transfer<br />
frequency and thereby attempt to shed light on the mechanism by which<br />
social structure affected corruption in a specific setting. First, however,<br />
we need a proxy for social structure.<br />
6 Riots and Social Structure in India<br />
Indian society is extremely diverse, containing numerous social groups<br />
divided by caste, religion, language and other traits. Many social and<br />
cultural activities, including mutual reciprocal aid, tend to be concen-<br />
trated within these groups, and group boundaries are often very rigid.<br />
However, despite this social heterogeneity, members of different social<br />
groups in India may be highly economically interdependent. Tradition-<br />
ally, this interdependence often took the form of a caste-based division<br />
of labor; low-caste laborers and artisans served wealthier high-caste<br />
landowners in exchange for an implicit assurance of survival in bad<br />
crop years and emergencies (Platteau 1995).<br />
In modern India, the nature and extent of social and economic “in-<br />
tegration” varies greatly. Because these widely varying informal en-<br />
vironments interact with a relatively uniform formal system, India is<br />
a particularly appropriate context in which to study the interaction<br />
between formal and informal “rules”.<br />
But there‟s a problem: in the face of this tremendous diversity, how<br />
can we measure the level of social integration in a quantifiable yet<br />
meaningful way? To measure the level of integration properly, we would<br />
27<br />
need to be able to observe which “groups” are relevant in each instance<br />
(and Indian society contains many cross-cutting divisions) and the type<br />
of interaction between their members. Clearly, any direct measurement<br />
of this sort is impossible, so our measure must necessarily be indirect.<br />
There are two main approaches to indirectly measuring related vari-<br />
ables (“trust”, “civic-ness”, “social capital” etc.) in the literature. The<br />
first is to use survey responses (eg., Knack and Keefer 1997). The<br />
second approach is to look for suitable proxies. For example, Putnam<br />
(1993) uses membership in formal associations, newspaper readership,<br />
and voter turnout in referenda to compare “civic-ness” in Italian re-<br />
gions. Putnam‟s indices are less appropriate to the Indian context, but<br />
this section argues that in India, the incidence of riots can serve as a<br />
proxy for social integration (a low level of riots reflecting a high level<br />
of social integration).<br />
Why do riots occur in some places more than in others? Fearon and<br />
Laitin (1996) argue that in situations where intergroup conflict can<br />
occur, potentially violent situations are often defused if some members<br />
of each group have an interest in intergroup harmony (for example,<br />
because they are involved in valuable intergroup trade). When trouble<br />
is brewing, individuals with a vested interest in peace often step in to<br />
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