Politics of the past: the use and abuse of history - Socialists ...

only to non-citizens, but also to naturalized citizens” (LCHR 2006,
249) – a clear demonstration that history makes a difference when
cultural rights are apportioned. In the legal arena, the Constitutional
Court’s decision on the issue of the 2004 amendments to the Latvian
Law on Education (mandating increased use of Latvian as the
language of instruction in minority schools) the all-important conclusions
of which include a reference to the occupation of Latvia in
1940, is another example (LR Satversmes Tiesa 2005, 23-24).
Linking multicultural policies to historical arguments is not unusual,
but in the Latvian case, has been counterproductive. It has neither
bridged the gap of historical perceptions nor helped create a more
inclusive and consolidated society.
While the tradition of critical thinking about history has been dormant,
politicians and leaders of public opinion have come to the
fore as the most influential interpreters of the past. Political actors
have been profiting from this device, but not the two ethno-linguistic
groups themselves. For two decades they have lived under the
influence of discourses on existential insecurity that feed on divisive
and self-victimizing interpretations of historical facts. The Russianspeaking
Latvians’ slow and reluctant identity transition from Soviet
to Latvian citizens and denizens has been matched by the ethnic
Latvians’ reluctance to accept them as compatriots – both in legal
and political terms. Within this framework, what is perceived as occupation
denial on the behalf of many Russian-speaking Latvians
stems not so much from a principled refutation of this historical
event as from a fear of being held culpable. A 2007 report
describes this history trap well. Focusing on the young generation’s
entanglement with history, it acknowledges that even today,
Russian-speaking young people are associated with the political
heritage of the Soviet occupation and held responsible for the
events of the past. “Compared to older generations, the young
people may have less difficulty in accepting a shift in the dominant
interpretation of history. Still, they do not wish to take upon themselves
the political heritage and the responsibility; nor do they
accept scornful labelling.” (Golubeva et al. 2007, 152)
In the contest of historical narratives, Russia is a significant third
player: first, because it is a major and increasingly powerful source
of Russian historical narratives often at odds with those shared by
the majority of Latvians and second, because the Russia factor
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