Politics of the past: the use and abuse of history - Socialists ...
Politics of the past: the use and abuse of history - Socialists ...
Politics of the past: the use and abuse of history - Socialists ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Prague Spring: “In <strong>the</strong> mid-1950s, Czechoslovakian society <strong>and</strong><br />
broad swa<strong>the</strong>s <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Communist Party began to suspect <strong>the</strong> truth<br />
about <strong>the</strong> crimes committed. That, toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> growing domestic<br />
difficulties facing <strong>the</strong> regime, as well as a crisis <strong>of</strong> morality<br />
<strong>and</strong> values, indirectly led people to remember <strong>the</strong> ideas <strong>and</strong> values<br />
<strong>of</strong> Czech <strong>and</strong> Czechoslovakian social democracy under <strong>the</strong> first<br />
<strong>and</strong> third republics. Analyses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> situation printed in an anthology<br />
that <strong>the</strong> leaders <strong>of</strong> our party-in-exile published in London in<br />
1958, predicted that a major internal social disruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Stalinist regime in Prague would soon become inevitable.”<br />
While social democrats ref<strong>use</strong>d any compromise with <strong>the</strong> fascist<br />
dictators, <strong>the</strong>y have been acc<strong>use</strong>d <strong>of</strong> not doing enough to challenge<br />
communism. It is even said that by entering into dialogue with<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial communist parties, social democrats prolonged <strong>the</strong> regimes.<br />
Europeans in general were acc<strong>use</strong>d by <strong>the</strong> Americans <strong>and</strong> communist<br />
opponents <strong>of</strong> being too s<strong>of</strong>t <strong>and</strong> for that reason, in dissident<br />
circles, NATO was more popular than <strong>the</strong> European<br />
Communities. This also explains <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> myth that Reagan’s<br />
confrontational policies towards <strong>the</strong> USSR lead to its downfall.<br />
In reality it collapsed under its own dead weight, or as Norman<br />
Davies said “I usually liken it to a dinosaur that had a heart attack<br />
<strong>and</strong> died on its feet.” With hindsight one has to admit, never<strong>the</strong>less,<br />
that dialogue did not deliver concrete results. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r h<strong>and</strong>, we<br />
do not know what <strong>the</strong> situation would have been if <strong>the</strong>se contacts<br />
had not existed.<br />
Leading western social democrats believed that <strong>the</strong>y could promote<br />
change from within <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y were not <strong>the</strong> only ones. They based<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir model <strong>of</strong> cooperation <strong>and</strong> convergence on this assumption,<br />
convinced that a process <strong>of</strong> confrontation was dangerous for <strong>the</strong><br />
whole continent <strong>and</strong> would have especially dire consequences for<br />
<strong>the</strong> two Germanys. This implicated a certain acceptation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> status<br />
quo but who in those years could have imagined what happened<br />
after 1989? In <strong>the</strong> 1980s, Western Europe was in <strong>the</strong> grip<br />
<strong>of</strong> a threatening regional nuclear arms race <strong>and</strong> those who opposed<br />
new missile deployments tried to find allies on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
Iron Curtain. The Helsinki Agreements, concluded in <strong>the</strong> 1970s,<br />
were <strong>the</strong> embodiment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contradictions <strong>of</strong> pan-European politics.<br />
For <strong>the</strong> Russians <strong>the</strong>y symbolised <strong>the</strong> acceptance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> status<br />
quo; <strong>the</strong> Americans emphasised <strong>the</strong> human rights dimension.<br />
26