Politics of the past: the use and abuse of history - Socialists ...
Politics of the past: the use and abuse of history - Socialists ...
Politics of the past: the use and abuse of history - Socialists ...
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esult <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> hope <strong>of</strong> concluding endless debates. These efforts are<br />
equally guided by <strong>the</strong> inspirational effect that ‘a <strong>history</strong> we have<br />
lived through toge<strong>the</strong>r’ – <strong>and</strong> which we <strong>the</strong>refore hope we can write<br />
toge<strong>the</strong>r – can have on a wider audience. Thirdly, while <strong>the</strong> conflictbased,<br />
nationalist approach to <strong>history</strong> continues to have a significant<br />
mass impact in both countries, it is being pushed to <strong>the</strong><br />
margins <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> field.<br />
While highlighting <strong>the</strong> ongoing debates, we are also looking for an<br />
answer to <strong>the</strong> question why our common <strong>history</strong> is still a source <strong>of</strong><br />
national conflicts ra<strong>the</strong>r than something which underlines <strong>the</strong> need<br />
for rapprochement. In spite <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indisputable historical fact <strong>of</strong> multilayered<br />
co-existence, <strong>the</strong> common Hungarian-Slovak <strong>history</strong> is an<br />
ambivalent inheritance. For nearly a thous<strong>and</strong> years, <strong>the</strong> traditions<br />
<strong>and</strong> values <strong>of</strong> our common statehood have been <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong><br />
polemics <strong>and</strong> debates. To a large extent <strong>the</strong>y still are: <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />
teachable, comprehensive historical interpretation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong><br />
our common <strong>history</strong>.<br />
The picture has changed only very slowly, after 1989. When treating<br />
our common <strong>past</strong>, <strong>the</strong> acknowledgement, recognition <strong>and</strong> promotion<br />
<strong>of</strong> public awareness <strong>of</strong> our common inheritance, co-exist<br />
with <strong>the</strong> alienation from everything that is Hungarian <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> denial<br />
<strong>of</strong> everything that was demonstrably not Hungarian within historical<br />
Hungary. Accepting or rejecting, teaching or misconstruing our<br />
common <strong>history</strong>, or using it for political goals in a blinkered approach<br />
to <strong>history</strong> – based on linguistic <strong>and</strong> cultural differences – are<br />
central to <strong>the</strong> survival <strong>of</strong> national prejudice <strong>and</strong> stereotypes.<br />
Mutual minorities<br />
The difficulties <strong>of</strong> dealing with <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>history</strong> in a framework <strong>of</strong> nation<br />
states are paralleled in <strong>the</strong> complications <strong>of</strong> managing national<br />
minority issues. Building exclusive nation-states in this region could<br />
only have been possible by accepting ethnic cleansing <strong>and</strong><br />
homogenisation. During periods <strong>of</strong> dictatorship in <strong>the</strong> 20 th century<br />
actual opportunities for such practices arose. Both states applied<br />
<strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> collective punishment <strong>of</strong> communities <strong>of</strong> non-<br />
Slovaks <strong>and</strong> non-Hungarians respectively, along with non-<br />
Christians. The result was <strong>the</strong> destruction <strong>of</strong> many hundreds <strong>of</strong><br />
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