Evaluating Country Programmes - OECD Online Bookshop
Evaluating Country Programmes - OECD Online Bookshop
Evaluating Country Programmes - OECD Online Bookshop
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Real Progress: Fifty Years of USAID in Costa Rica<br />
1945 and 1995, the United States provided USD2 billion in economic aid to Costa<br />
Rica on average, about USD20 per year or USD1 000 for each Costa Rican. The average<br />
American citizen paid USD40 dollars (80 cents a year) in taxes to provide for<br />
Costa Ricans, who were among the most favoured recipients of US foreign aid during<br />
the period. Only the citizens of Israel, Vietnam, Egypt, and Jamaica received<br />
more per capita. What was there about the United States and about Costa Rica that<br />
would persuade ten successive American presidents to take money from US citizens<br />
to give to Costa Ricans?<br />
Two basic arguments have traditionally been used to support US foreign aid:<br />
American self-interest and American altruism. So stated, these two lines of argument<br />
are mutually exclusive. If a course of action is justified by real benefit to the<br />
United States, it is not, by definition, altruistic. An altruistic reason is one from<br />
which no benefit can be expected other than the satisfaction of having done “the<br />
right thing”. Aid proponents in the United States have sought to marry these two<br />
purposes, asserting that US national security interests are best served by economic<br />
aid programmes that benefit poor people in developing countries. 2<br />
For most of the period since 1945, US foreign policy has been based on the<br />
belief that the United States was locked in a global struggle with international communism,<br />
a powerful force antithetical to US purposes and interests. Until the collapse<br />
of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, US foreign policy maintained a<br />
consistent world view-one articulated by George Kennan in the famous “X” article<br />
in Foreign Affairs in 1947. Even though Kennan later repudiated some aspects of the<br />
policy, ten presidents consistently followed it. US foreign policy interests believed<br />
national security depended on “winning” this struggle, and foreign aid was seen as<br />
one element of the programme to ensure that outcome.<br />
An unadorned national security rationale would give no emphasis to the recipient<br />
country’s use of the foreign aid. US foreign policy, however, saw the struggle with<br />
the USSR also in moral terms. Buying the support of corrupt dictators was both suspect<br />
and unlikely to be a successful long-term policy. Unless the United States were<br />
to use its foreign policy to promote economic development, communism would<br />
become more attractive as a force for modernisation. Thus, the sophisticated security<br />
rationale linked the US goal of national security with economic and social progress in<br />
the aid-receiving country. The United States would do well by doing good.<br />
Why Costa Rica?<br />
Costa Rica was a highly favoured recipient of US assistance. On a per capita<br />
basis, Costa Rica received eight times as much as Latin American countries generally<br />
from 1945 to 1993, and far more than Asian or African nations. On a world-wide<br />
per capita basis, Costa Rica was fifth among US aid recipients. Why?<br />
<strong>OECD</strong> 1999<br />
233