Evaluating Country Programmes - OECD Online Bookshop
Evaluating Country Programmes - OECD Online Bookshop
Evaluating Country Programmes - OECD Online Bookshop
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<strong>Evaluating</strong> <strong>Country</strong> <strong>Programmes</strong><br />
260<br />
– Export promotion. Economists are divided about whether policy alone can produce<br />
desired results, or whether promotion activities are also helpful. In<br />
Costa Rica, promotion clearly reinforced and sped up the growth and diversification<br />
of export production. The evidence is overwhelming that USAID<br />
played a key role in ending Costa Rica’s dependence on coffee, bananas,<br />
sugar, and beef exports. The major share of Costa Rican exports – as well as<br />
the most dynamic part – are now exports of manufactured products to the<br />
industrial countries, non-traditional agricultural exports, and tourism. In all<br />
three areas, Costa Rica’s exports in 1982 were modest, and no institutional<br />
base for developing exports was in place. USAID worked collaboratively to<br />
create the institutional base, and the export results were spectacular (see<br />
Box 11.1).<br />
– Scholarships. USAID sent more than 5 000 Costa Ricans abroad, mostly to the<br />
United States, for study. Unquestionably this substantially increased the<br />
number of skilled people in the society. The upper levels of government,<br />
academia, and other institutions are filled with ex-USAID scholars. In some<br />
years, 40% or more of all Costa Ricans studying in the United States (or more<br />
than one-third of all those studying abroad) were financed by USAID. Agency<br />
approaches appear to have been sound, selecting both strong candidates<br />
and people who would return to Costa Rica after completing their studies.<br />
– Structural adjustment. Costa Rica followed terrible economic policies during<br />
1978-81. The economic situation in 1982 was catastrophic and, without largescale<br />
US support, the country would have had a prolonged depression, from<br />
which it still might not have emerged by 1995. Close personal and professional<br />
relationships between USAID personnel and Costa Rican government<br />
officials appear to have been a major factor in achieving success. This suggests<br />
a comparative advantage for USAID in such programmes, in contrast to<br />
the relatively arm’s length approach of the multilateral agencies, which<br />
frequently leads to open conflict and slow reform.<br />
Evaluation in foreign policy terms<br />
To what extent did aid in the 1980s achieve broad US foreign policy goals? The<br />
answer appears to be: completely. Central America today has democratically<br />
elected governments in every country; economic policies are generally satisfactory;<br />
social tensions have eased; and armed conflict has disappeared from the region<br />
except in Guatemala, where low-level guerrilla activity has been going on for more<br />
than three decades. In sum, Central America is no longer a policy headache for the<br />
US Government–the outcome sought by most members of Congress who voted for<br />
aid to the region. 10<br />
<strong>OECD</strong> 1999