Evaluating Country Programmes - OECD Online Bookshop

OECD 1999
Real Progress: Fifty Years of USAID in Costa Rica
– Aid does not work in a bad policy regime. The most unsuccessful period in
USAID/Costa Rica’s history was in the late 1970s, when programmes tended
to reinforce government policies that were largely unsustainable. Most
USAID projects during this period left few permanent results. They presupposed
that Costa Rican government resources would grow sufficiently to
complement funds provided by USAID and, subsequently, to finance recurrent
costs associated with USAID-sponsored activities. Neither assumption
was justified. The government was forced to cut back sharply on existing programmes,
and the welfare of poor people in Costa Rica dropped rapidly during
the period when USAID’s commitment to direct poverty reduction was
strongest.
– Institution building is harder than it looks. Costa Rica provided a relatively
favourable environment for development, yet institution building still
proved difficult. The Ministry of Agriculture received substantial support
over three decades but never became the development institution envisioned
by USAID. Efforts to institutionalise highway maintenance in the Ministry
of Transport never completely succeeded. The Costa Rican Government
recently abolished two institutions USAID had a substantial role in creating:
a municipal financing and advisory institute and a national technological
research institute. USAID assistance to an environmental non-governmental
organisation built up the organisation’s finances much faster than its institutional
stability warranted, and the NGO self-destructed in battles over leadership
and direction. The poor performance in this area seems due to
simplistic ideas about how institutions should work. USAID staff sometimes
assumed that the right organisational structure would lead to decisionmaking
on technical rather than political grounds. This is unlikely to happen,
because the operation of an institution will be strongly affected by the
unwritten rules of the society in which it is embedded.
– USAID sometimes jeopardises its successes by staying too long. USAID
work in export promotion during the early years of Costa Rica’s structural
adjustment was critical to its success. Nevertheless, the continuing abundance
of resources and USAID’s desire to build on this success led the
Agency to maintain a longer, higher-profile involvement in export promotion
than was appropriate. While the early years were catalytic, the eventual
result was an oversized institution too dependent on continued USAID
resources. On a larger scale, this lesson probably applies to the entire local
currency programme, where USAID micromanagement continued too long.
– Failure sometimes looks like success. Costa Rica’s participation in the
Central American Common Market looked like a success in 1970, and reputable
economists had models that purported to prove it. With a longer-term
perspective, it now seems likely that the Common Market hindered Costa
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