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Evaluating Country Programmes - OECD Online Bookshop

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<strong>Evaluating</strong> <strong>Country</strong> <strong>Programmes</strong><br />

272<br />

Notes<br />

1. This paper uses “USAID” as shorthand for all US Government economic assistance programmes<br />

to Costa Rica. USAID was established only in 1961, and earlier programmes<br />

operated under different names. The largest single project, the Inter-American Highway,<br />

was administered by a US domestic agency, the Bureau of Public Roads.<br />

2. Despite this national security rationale for USAID's presence in Costa Rica, Costa Ricans<br />

interviewed were virtually unanimous in believing that the American USAID employees<br />

were there for altruistic reasons.<br />

3. This figure is based on self-reported education levels for the 1984 population census.<br />

4. These comparisons are based on estimates of purchasing power parity (perhaps better<br />

known as PPP). Exchange rate-based estimates differ significantly, though the relative<br />

standing is not affected. By the more common measure of GDP, using exchange rates,<br />

Costa Rica's per capita GDP in 1995 was approximately USD2 600.<br />

5. The least expensive form of housing, a rancho, was a one-room house with dirt floor and<br />

thatched roof.<br />

6. Take-off refers to the stage at which a society has achieved a certain momentum in the<br />

pace of change, whereby it can soar like an airplane into sustainable growth.<br />

7. Nugent (1974) estimates that the CACM added about 0.6% each year to Central American<br />

GDP (or more than 7% over the period 1960-72), while Cline and Delgado (1978) offer the<br />

somewhat lower estimate of an addition of 3-4% to regional GDP during 1960-72.<br />

8. As noted earlier, many development economists were not convinced that there were any<br />

serious problems with the development strategy being pursued during this period.<br />

Developing-country economic growth had been rapid and sustained for nearly two<br />

decades, and the emerging calamity was seen with much greater clarity in hindsight than<br />

it was at the time.<br />

9. USAID/Costa Rica did not completely ignore such issues. The strategy paper it submitted<br />

to Washington in January 1981 recognised that the Costa Rican Government was making<br />

unreasonable forecasts of macroeconomic trends, but it did not recommend any<br />

action to address the unreality.<br />

10. While there may be general agreement that the outcome was satisfactory, there would<br />

likely be sharp division on the reasons for this. Some would argue that military aid to the<br />

Contras in Nicaragua was an important part of the solution, whereas others would argue<br />

that the right outcome was achieved by congressional action to limit the role of the Contras<br />

and to emphasise peaceful approaches.<br />

11. These estimates are based on exchange rate-based estimates of GDP. Using estimates<br />

based on purchasing power parity, value of the annual addition to production would be<br />

substantially larger.<br />

<strong>OECD</strong> 1999

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