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Download the file - United Nations Rule of Law

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is concentrated in <strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> few, and/orland and income distribution is skewed resultingin extreme inequality, political authorities areunlikely to implement and enforce property rightsin an equitable manner. 67 This indicates that <strong>the</strong>evolution <strong>of</strong> property rights systems is to a largeextent determined by historical conditions, suchas <strong>the</strong> distribution <strong>of</strong> factors <strong>of</strong> production. 68Realising TurnaroundUnderstanding <strong>the</strong> likely impact <strong>of</strong> reforms onnon-poor groups with significant influenceis critical to assess potential support and oppositionfor reforms. 69 Besides promoting pro-poorproperty rights it is <strong>the</strong>refore important to establishproperty rights systems that are beneficialfor middle classes and groups with significantassets and political influence. The message to allis that in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> generalised and equitableproperty rights systems much <strong>of</strong> economicactivity does not develop its full potential evenfor powerful actors 70 ; <strong>the</strong>re is a high likelihood <strong>of</strong>social unrest 71 ; <strong>the</strong>re may be under-accumulation<strong>of</strong> human capital resulting in a low quality labourforce, and little demand for credit resulting in underdevelopedfinancial institutions and ultimatelyhindered growth. There is also less foreign investmentor flight <strong>of</strong> capital when property rights arenot guaranteed.scenario. The emergence <strong>of</strong> property rights and<strong>the</strong> distribution <strong>of</strong> resources may have mutualcausal effect. 73 Examples <strong>of</strong> countries like Chinaand Singapore teach us that an alternative route<strong>of</strong> political authorities consenting to reforms isa possibility where inequalities are less extreme.The issue <strong>of</strong> better understanding how to devisemechanisms for convincing <strong>the</strong> political authoritiesor circumventing <strong>the</strong>ir influence in orderto induce <strong>the</strong> reform constitutes an importantchallenge. An important implication <strong>of</strong> this viewis that a drastic one-time reform may have longlasting consequences, setting <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> everimproving distribution along side with more equitableproperty rights systems.Provided that inequalities are not too extreme,equitable property rights may emerge preciselybecause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir beneficial consequences forgroups with significant assets and political influence.They may also emerge out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> desire<strong>of</strong> elites to avoid adverse consequences fromexceeding numbers <strong>of</strong> poor people not havingaccess to property rights. 72 Indeed, several recentexamples in Asia, where political leadersinduced progressive reforms, including equitableproperty rights, are illustrative <strong>of</strong> precisely this81

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