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e restructured in a way that reduces inefficiencyand waste and avoids inertia. This strategy may bepolitically sensitive, however. Civil service unionsare very powerful in many developing countries,and for decades they and their members haveenjoyed almost complete tenure and salary protections,little oversight, and few serious demands. Itmay therefore be risky for the government to takeon the civil service unions by proposing reformsthat would threaten the power or livelihoods ofthese unions and their members. Therefore, measuresenhancing bureaucratic justice and servicequality need to take into account the interestsof both the civil servants and their representingorganisations. Reorganisations might be moreacceptable if they are build on trust rather thandisapproval, motivate good practices rather thanpunish incompetence, stimulate learning fromfeedback rather than reprimand underperformance,and provide safeguards for justified concernsregarding job security, wage guarantees andstatus. Approaching this delicate issue thereforerequires skilful politicians to enter into a consensus-buildingprocess with stakeholders and puttogether ‘package deals’ in which the existing civilservice establishment is given benefits in exchangefor accepting reforms that promote greaterbureaucratic productivity and efficiency. As analternative or complementary strategy, reformerscould try to build a countervailing coalition thatwould push for bureaucratic reform.A fourth type of strategy might promote decentralisation,bureaucratic redundancy, or somedegree of privatisation in service delivery, at leastfor certain types of service. The advantages ofdecentralisation are that it brings bureaucracy‘closer to the people’, may increase accountabilityand responsiveness to local needs, and maypromote healthy competition between regions iflocal governments have input into bureaucraticgovernance within their jurisdictions (Girishankaret al. 2002). Decentralization, however, mayincrease risks of corruption if it weakens centralizedoversight and depends on local individualsto make impartial decisions on matters affectingtheir family, friends, and enemies (UNDP 2006).Decentralization may also reduce competence ifpowerful central bureaucracies are more likely toattract talented individuals.Bureaucratic redundancy — that is, having two ormore separate agencies or office provide the sameservice to the same target population — has threemain advantages. First, it reduces the likelihoodof incompetence or corruption by giving consumerswith a choice of provider (Shleifer and Vishny1993). Second, if bureaucrats are rewarded atleast partially on the basis of demand for theirservices, redundancy may lead to healthy competitionbetween providers. Third, redundancymay facilitate experimentation and innovation.Bureaucratic redundancy also has costs, however.The first and most obvious is the extra budgetarycost of staffing two or more offices to provide essentiallythe same service. The second concernis that the existence of multiple providers mayblur lines of accountability and, if incentives areimproperly aligned, may encourage bureaucrats to‘let the other guy do the hard work’ (Ting 2003).Privatisation of service delivery functions holdsthe promise of more efficient service delivery.Consumer choice, value for money, proximity tothe client and hands-on mentality are some appealingelements of this basic change towardsgovernance (Rhodes, 1997). The remix of bureaucraciesand markets containing the use ofbusiness principles and incentive structures isbelieved to motivate both the publicly and privatelyorganised service providers to adjust theservice delivery to the specific customers’ needs,resulting in an increase in effectiveness, respon-52