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(on fi le at FAO: http://www.fao.org/sd/LTdirect/LTan0025.htm).48 Nielsen 2006: 206; CLEP Uganda: 21, CLEP Indonesia, CLEP Philippines,CLEP Sri Lanka: 13.49 Ann Whitehead and Dzodzi Tsikata 2003: 77.50 Izumi 2007.51 Agarwal 1994.52 ICRW 2005: 3.53 Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000.54 Not always, for example, Inuit are 85 percent of the semi-autonomousGreenland region of Denmark. Indigenous people represent half or morecitizens of Guatemala, Peru and especially Bolivia.55 In 1972 the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations accepteda defi nition, amended in 1983 and 1986. The ILO Convention No. 169 in1989 accepted a broader defi nition, embodied in the UN Declaration onthe Rights of Indigenous Peoples.56 There are people in other regions regulating their land relationsthrough indigenous norms. They are mainly members of indigenous minorities,such as Native Americans in North America, Sami in the northernpolar areas of Europe and Russia and native peoples of Australiaand New Zealand. They are excluded here mainly because comparativelyextremely few of their number are defi nitively ‘poor’.57 Kaelin 2006: 175.58 An estimated 25 million persons have been displaced by armedconfl ict in more than 40 countries. In Africa, the number of IDPs reaches13.2 million, in Central and South America 3.7 million, in Asia 3.3 million,in Europe 3 million, and in the Middle East 2.1 million. In 2004, thelargest internal displacement situations were Sudan (5-6 million IDPs),Colombia (2 - 3 million), DRC (2.3 million), Uganda (up to 2 million),and Iraq (over 1 million). Sudan, Uganda, Colombia, Iraq, Somalia, andNepal were the scene of major new displacement during the same year,whereas DRC, Angola, Southern Sudan, Liberia, Burundi, and CentralAfrican Republic saw major return movements. (Norwegian RefugeeCouncil, Global IDP Project, Internal Displacement — Global Overviewof Trends and Developments in 2004, Geneva March 2005: 5-6, 10.)59 Drawn from Kaelin 2006.60 See Handbook on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees andDisplaced Persons 2007.61 Acemoglu et al. 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; de Soto 1989,2000; Roll and Talbott 2001.62 The proportion of owners resisting expropriation against marketvalue compensation is high. In a case reported by Galiani and Schargrodsky(2004: 5) the proportion is 5 resisting to 8 agreeing.63 See Chapter 1, Section 2; de Soto 1989: 201-230.64 See de Soto 2000: 200-202.65 See USAID 2007: 21-23.66 Gradstein 2006.67 Chong and Gradstein 2007b show that inequality subverts egalitarianproperty rights systems.68 ‘…the initial conditions had lingering effects, not only becausecertain fundamental characteristics of New World economies were difficult to change, but also because government policies and institutionstended to reproduce them. Specifi cally, in those societies that beganwith extreme inequality, elites were better able to establish a legalframework that insured them disproportionate shares of political power,and to use that greater infl uence to establish rules, laws, and othergovernment policies that advantaged members of the elites relative tonon-members — contributing to persistence over time of the high degreeof inequality.’ (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000).69 Coudouel et al. 2007: 6.70 Chong and Gradstein 2007a; Dabla-Norris et al. 2007.71 Acemoglu and Robinson 2005.72 Gradstein 2006; Deininger and Squire 1998.73 Chong and Gradstein 2007.74 USAID 2007.75 Jacoby and Minten 2005.76 Major comparative reviews of evidence of impacts on investmentand access to credit suggest that titling and registration of land is mostlikely to be effective where robust formal fi nancial markets already existand where there are incentives for investment created by factorssuch as proximity to urban markets and good quality land (Bruce andMigot-Adholla 1994; Feder and Nishio (1996). Studies that particularlyfocus on the poor suggest that credit and other benefi ts may be heavilyskewed toward large landholders (Carter and Olinto 2003).77 Almost never occurs outside developed countries: Okoth Ogendo1999; Alden Wily and Mbaya 2001; Hunt 2004.78 For example, in India, the amount of bribes paid every year by usersof land administration services is estimated at US$700 million (TransparencyInternational India 2005), three-quarters of the public spendingon science, technology, and environment.79 China was the fi rst centrally planned economy to link the collectivesystem to household size farms. Households were allowed to contracttheir share of the collective land and cultivate it individually, inreturn paying to the collective a fi xed amount of produce, taxes andfees (Household Responsibility System). In a fi rst stage, results wereimpressive as China’s grain production increased from 321.2 milliontons in 1979 to 407.1 million tons in 1984 (a fi ve-year increase of 27percent, or 5.4 percent a year). The increase slowed down afterwards to469.5 million tons in 2004. Further gains seem more diffi cult to achieve.More investment and access to credit is required in order to improve irrigation,drainage, land terracing, soil upgrades, etc. Today, the Chinesefarmers’ use rights suffer from land grabbing by offi cials or by frequentand unpredictable readjustments of land rights. The number of sticksin farmer’s property rights bundle is still insuffi cient; the practice ofland readjustment has been the main source of land tenure insecurityin China since the decollectivisation of agriculture. Farmers are thereforeunwilling to make productivity-enhancing investments that wouldrequire several years to recover, such as irrigation, drainage, or landterracing. See Prosterman 2006: 113. In 1998 the Government of Tajikistan,with the support of the World Bank, began the implementationof the Farm Privatization Support Project (FPSP). Ten farms covering anarea of 17,000 hectares were privatised to individual families. First,farms were divided into their constituent brigades and per capita landwas divided among farmers. Inheritable but not tradable land use certificates were provided by the state land committee to individual farm-116