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Box 5.4 Organising out ofPoverty: Taxis in RwandaThe International Cooperatives Alliance, the InternationalTrade Union Confederation (formerly theICFTU) and the International Labour Organisationhave teamed up to develop an approach known asSYNDICOOP. ‘SYNDICOOP promotes trade unions andcooperatives — membership-based organisations forworkers in the informal economy. And because theyare membership organisations, they can be accountable.’An example is Assetamorwa (Association del’Esperance des Taxis Moto au Rwanda) inRwanda. ‘Each driver is an individual trader, negotiatingfares with passengers. But by combining together,they support each other and can negotiate with theauthorities of Kigali, the Rwandan capital.’ Assetamorwahas organised a system of pooling moneythat its members can tap in turn (known as tontine)and a health insurance fund for members. The groupalso trains young drivers, runs a garage and sparepartsdepot, and works to combat the spread ofHIV/AIDS. All of this activity depends on the necessaryframework legislation on freedom of association andcooperatives being in place at the national level.Source: Stirling Smith and Cilla Ross, Organising out of poverty:Stories from the grassroots: How the SYNDICOOP approach hasworked in East Africa (Co-operative College, Oldham, 2006).violence and intimidation among taxi associations(Barrett 2003).Fortunately, freedom of association is guaranteedby law in South Africa, and the governmenthas a non-judicial mechanism to resolvedisputes through mediation and conciliation. Thus,institutional and legal conditions exist for overcomingthe industry’s problems. The government hastried to reassert its regulatory authority and formalizethe industry. After consultation with stakeholders,a financial incentive programmeme has beendeveloped to encourage operators to upgrade theminibus fleet, join designated membership associations,keep better records and begin payingtaxes on their enterprises (van der Merwe 2007).The effectiveness of these efforts to supplant theinformal institutions and practices remains to beproven, however.This example is extreme, and Box 5.4 reports amuch more encouraging case of a taxi drivers’organisation from Africa; nevertheless, it makes thepoint that development practitioners face dilemmasin dealing with informality (and, by extension,with decentralised and local institutions generally).There are obvious advantages to exercising rightsthrough personalized and traditional authority becauseit is less expensive, more familiar and locallyavailable. Yet, just because de facto or relationship-basedauthority is embedded in poor communitiesdoes not mean they must be constructivein fighting poverty and injustice, as the violentfeuding of the South African taxi case vividly illustrates.A patron-client network, or clique, mayprovide a safe haven for society’s most vulnerable,but it limits their options also, long-establishedrules for allocating resources may work when thepopulation is small, but they might buckle underpopulation pressure. Additionally, a private legalmechanism may be accessible, but it could easilyplay favourites depending on a plaintiff’s personalconnections.A bottom-line concern is that development professionalsmust creatively seek to capitalise on theavailable mix of de facto or ‘traditional’ modes ofauthority. There is no reason to assume that theinformal institutions, rules and arrangements areeither superior or inferior to their de jure or ‘modern’counterparts. Context is critical. India is a possiblemodel for how to integrate representative andlegal institutions, having extended official recognitionto a system of village councils and people’s306