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There may be sound policy reasons for seekingto modify or eliminate some existing tenurialpractices. It is important, however, that anysuch reforms are the result of informed andparticipatory decision-making, and not theinadvertent result of poorly designed or implementedtitling processes.3) Concentration and Discrimination. In manycountries, including the countries of the formerSoviet Union, it has been observed that somepeople may be less well positioned to participateeffectively in the documentation and registrationprocess than others, with the effect thattheir rights are poorly protected. Individualswho loose in such contexts are usually women,absentee right holders or mortgagees, and ingeneral people with less education and limitedaccess to information becoming victim to manipulationand fraud.4) Increase in Disputes. Registration of landis expected to reduce the incidence of landdisputes, by clarifying boundaries, by resolvingambiguities about rights over land and byputting in place a registration system that istransparent, reliable and accessible. In theshort term, however, the process of adjudicationand formalisation of rights may bringto the surface latent disputes that may haveotherwise remained below the surface. Suchpotential risk needs to be assessed in theplanning phase of a reform project.5) Capitalisation: Difficult for the Poor in Absenceof Adequate Land and Capital Markets.State of the art analysis reveals only a modestpositive effect of land titling on access tomortgage credit, and no impact on access toother forms of credit. It shows no effect on thelabour income of the households holding newtitles. However, it is shown that moving a poorhousehold from uncertain usufructuary rightsto a more complete bundle of property rightssubstantially increased investment in the familyhouses. Property registration and guaranteeof the homes reduced the size of families andthese smaller families invested more in theeducation of their children. Another study findsthat formal property rights lead to more availabletime for productive activities of propertyholders who do no longer need to defend theirassets. 94Property rights bring increased economic benefitswhen linked to a functional credit systemand market, but they do not, by themselves,cause the emergence of a functional and propoorcredit system. 95 Legal property rights effectivelylead to credit and investment whererobust financial markets exist and where thereare further incentives for investment. 96 Evenwhen in possession of titles and registeredproperty, small-scale farmers and the urbanpoor most often do not put their land or modestdwellings at risk by using them as collateralfor credit. 97 Tenure security and economicbenefits other than capitalisation via collateralof land property seem to be primordial forthe poor. Although they are efficient producers,small-scale farmers and business peopletend to lose out in land and financial marketswhich are regulated with provisions that privilegeconsolidation. Market based land reformstherefore now tend to be accompanied withtargeted credit for the poor.6) Costs and Benefits of Property Rights Protection.From the perspective of the poor andthe state, the costs of formal titles have tobe weighed against the costs of insecurity oftenure, or against informal costs (bribes) inobtaining titles which harm the poor and thestate. 98 In many unreformed contexts, only few85