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should be designed, what tradeoffs need to beconsidered, which risk mitigating mechanisms areworth trying, and what contextual variables needcareful monitoring during implementation. Adheringto this general set of guidelines will increasethe chances of successfully carrying out empowermentpolicies.Policy characteristicsThree internal policy characteristics (the lowermiddle box in Figure 5.2, above) stand out ininfluencing implementation: complexity, ambiguityand the potential for discord and conflict. Thesecharacteristics are important in all policy arenas butare especially relevant for the four domains of legalempowerment.ComplexityOther things being equal, the more complex a policyis, the harder it is to implement due to the intensityof the administrative effort required. On the scale ofcomplexity, Legal Empowerment of the Poor tendsto fall at the far end. As seen by the Commission,the paradigm for empowerment is holistic and thushighly ambitious. Ideally, the poor should obtainlegal protection for their physical and financialassets (property rights) and human capital (labourrights), and also have the ability to engage in markettransactions (business rights). Cutting across allthree areas is a need to obtain access to justiceand political decision making (legal identity andcitizenship rights). Those are a lot of balls to juggleduring implementation. It may be best to go forwardselectively and not dissipate energy on too many initiativesat once. On the other hand, progress in onlyone area without the others may create imbalancesthat perpetuate poverty.A second source of complexity is the fact that legaland regulatory systems are very robust; meaningthat reconfiguration of one or a few aspects of thelaw or institutions may not alter the overall risk andlack of opportunity poor people face. Social conventionsand structures develop over long periodswith many redundancies and mutually reinforcingelements. Progress in one domain of empowermentmay be neutralised by lack of progress in another.Unanticipated effects may also be triggered duringimplementation that undermine or bypass theintended beneficiaries. In Peru, for instance, the introductionof greater flexibility in the labour marketwas heralded as progress in the early to mid 1990s;one of its effects, however, was to drastically reducethe percentage of the population who enjoyed alegal status as employees, which had given themaccess to social protection. Poverty rates increasedin the short-term. Had the reform package beenless sweeping, or accompanied by a social floor ormitigating measures, this negative impact mighthave been avoided.Third is the time dimension to complexity. Empowermentpolicies seldom take effect quickly. Regardinglaw reform to promote the right to freedom ofassociation and collective bargaining, for instance,the ILO (2004: 110-111) has observed that fourto five years is the minimum time that should beallowed before substantive results can be seen. Ingeneral, delays make political back-tracking likely asministerial appointments change and bring in newministers who have little interest or commitmentto their predecessor’s programmemes. Hesitationin implementation reinforces any inclination of thepoor not to go along as expected with a policy in thefirst place. Individual uncertainty about implementationencourages the majority to hold back supportingthe reform, which creates a self-fulfilling prophecyof implementation slippage. Thus it is importantto look for interventions that promise short-termrewards for beneficiaries. Micro-finance, for example,can have an immediate (though perhaps notsustainable) effect on poor people’s consumption.308