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2007). Such mechanisms prove preferable forthe poor because they are more accessible thancourts, affordable, comprehensible and (often)effective. They can include government administrativetribunals, where paralegals can sometimesprovide representation, such as for agrarianreform and labour disputes in the Philippines.Third party arbitration courts have been set up inmany countries of the former Soviet Union where,in connection with livelihood projects, the partiesselect arbitrators for land, agrarian or propertydisputes.This is not to say that ADR is always preferableto, or mutually exclusive with, litigation. It canbe severely hampered by gender biases or otherpower imbalances between disputants (as canthe courts, however). It is often inappropriate forhandling criminal conduct, particularly violentconduct (though non-state systems are oftenstill used for that purpose). And there are manycontexts, such as with public interest litigation inSouth Africa, where going to court is an effectivelegal implementation strategy.From an economic perspective, ADR is most appropriatewhen the primary objective is to resolveindividual disputes over private rights and benefits(Landes and Posner 1979). For those sortsof disputes, the case for substantial public subsidisationof judicial dispute resolution is muchless compelling — though the state may stillneed to supply courts as a backstop to make surethe ADR processes comport with basic principlesof fairness. Reformers should attempt, when possible,to steer private disputes into appropriateforms of ADR, and to husband scarce judicialresources for disputes that involve public goods(including the articulation of norms and principles)and fundamental public values.In addition to the arbitration, mediation, and conciliationprogrammes traditionally associated withADR, reformers might also address the demandfor judicial services by encouraging or requiringthe resolution of more disputes (at least in thefirst instance) in the administrative bureaucracyrather than the courts. For example, the claimsof injured workers could be resolved by workers’compensation boards rather than in lawsuitsagainst employers. Consumer issues could bebrought before easy accessible, low-cost consumercommittees. A similar strategy for reducingdemand for expensive judicial services is to adoptreforms that allow for the resolution of certaintypes of disputes according to customary law orother traditional practices of the non-state sector.These approaches raise a host of additionalconcerns related to the equity and efficiency ofthe bureaucratic justice system and the non-statejustice system, which subsequent sections of thischapter will discuss in more detail. For purposesof the present discussion, bureaucratic and customarydispute resolution can be considered asspecial types of ADR.The design of just and effective ADR systemsis itself an enormous topic. It is also a subjectwhere it is difficult to make general recommendations,because the optimal design of ADR systemsdepends very much on the unique circumstancesof each country. Three concerns aboutADR programmes are especially prominent. Thefirst is that these programmes are often biasedin favour of powerful interests and lack adequatesafeguards to protect less sophisticated parties(UNDP 2005).The second concern is that ADR programmestend to become increasingly ‘proceduralised’over time — that is, they begin to look more likequasi-courts, and they lose the cost and speedadvantages that justified their creation in the firstplace. The third concern has to do with the final-26