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Table 5.3. Political Administrative SyndromesPoliticalCompetitionInstitutionalstability of the stateOrganisationalcapacity of the statePotential Legal Empowermentof the Poor policyinitiatives*National level reforms inhuman and economic rights;assert claims to existing legaland basic welfare services;work through established civilsocietyRule through stable andlegitimate organisationsand procedures; opencompetition for powerthrough programmematicpartiesRules of the game widelyrecognized as legitimateand not subject tosignifi cant change; conflictsresolved through appeal tothe rulesHigh. Organisationschallenged to improveperformance on a sustainedbasis.Rule through stable andlegitimate organisationsand procedures; no opencompetition for power.Political parties serve theregime or are hindered andcontrolled by itClear rules of the game andgenerally orderly processesof decision-making andpublic management are inplace; generally centralizedand authoritarian practices.Modest. Many organisationscarry out routine activitieson a sustained basis.Mobilisation of poor citizensfor greater influence over therange of legal protections andopportunities from the centreAn unstable mixture ofpersonal and impersonalrule, with varying degreesof legitimacy. Partiesare based partly onpersonalitiesRule through personalitiesand personal connections.If political partiesexist, they are based onpersonalities.Basic rules of the gameare established in lawand practice, althoughthey function poorly andintermittently.Low. There may be someorganisations that are ableto carry out responsibilitieson a sustained basis.Similar to above, but withpossibly more decentralisedfocus and more emphasis oninstitution building; corruptbureaucracy may be a biggerobstacleBypass strategies to get aroundcorrupt officials; incrementalsteps only; watch out for elitecaptureStability highly dependenton personal control ofpower. Rules of the gameemphasise power of elitesand personal connections toelites; there is confl ict overwho controls the stateLow. Organisations respondto the personal and shiftingpriorities of powerful elites.There is no effective centralgovernmentExtremely low. There are noeffective rules of the gamethat are agreed uponExtremely low. It is difficultto identify organisationsthat have any capacity toproduce results.Community-basedempowerment programmemes* Illustrative examples only; the activities in these cells are not mutually exclusive.to a study financed by the World Bank (Schneider2002). Half or more of the employment (includingsubsistence farming) in developing countriesis outside the formal sector. Earnings are low anduncertain, but these parallel market activities haveproven remarkably vital and have grown worldwidein new guises and unexpected places. Capturingthe positive attributes of the informal economywhile minimising the low productivity and hazardousworking conditions that go along with it, isone of the challenges of the legal empowermentagenda.Economic informality does have some advantagesfor the poor; for example, women may find home-303
ased work easier to fit in around their householdresponsibilities. Formal sector businesses maychoose to outsource work to informal workers togain flexibility. That said, these jobs are mostlyvery badly paid, often dangerous, and they relyheavily on children (ILO 2003). Most people whotoil in the parallel economy do so out of necessity,not freely exercised choice. Judith Tendler (2002)writes of an implicit ‘devil’s deal’ in Brazil and othercountries, whereby informal economy workers andentrepreneurs consent to support certain politicians.In return, the politicians agree not to enforce tax,environmental, or labour regulations; and to keepthe police and inspectors from harassing the poor.This arrangement is difficult for either side to getout of and it limits the options for legal empowerment.Tendler suggests the way to break the ‘devil’sdeal’ is by demonstrating the paths by which smallfirms grow into form ones, including treating workersbetter and helping to upgrade their skills.The boundary between the informal and the formaleconomies is fluid and poor people can push it in adirection that favours them. Cairo, to take an example,has an informal refuse collection system whichactually has a well-defined set of internal rights,responsibilities, and sanctions that evolved overseveral decades in response to a changing externalenvironment. The city tried to bring refuse collectionunder municipal control by issuing licenses to largecorporate contractors. Refuse collection is a majorenterprise for poor people so the city was threateningtheir livelihood. After negotiation and mutualadjustment, a new arrangement emerged in whichsmall-scale service providers selectively adoptedinstitutional forms recognised by the municipalauthorities, while hanging on to the personalisedand adaptable practices that marked their informalsystem (Assaad 1996). The second element ofinformality that concerns Legal Empowerment of thePoor policy implementation is found in the politicalsystem. Similar to what goes on in the economy,informality here is based on implicit and unwrittenunderstandings. In effect, it is a coping method forthe poor. The terms used to describe this grey governmentzone are ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘clientelism.’Its dimensions are hard to measure, but the informalpatron-client political system is widespread inmany countries and may crowd out the official statesystem of rule, along with that system’s broad policiesthat guarantee rights and distribute privilegesaccording to objective criteria.Patron-client politics emerge from webs ofpersonal bonds that develop between patronsand their individual clients or followers. Thesebonds are founded on mutual material advantage:the patron furnishes excludable resources (money,jobs) in return for support and cooperation (votes,attendance at rallies). Typically, marginalizedmembers of society are drawn into patron-clientarrangements as a more reliable means thanthe state to take care of their everyday concerns(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2004). Clientelismis widely seen as a barrier to more transparentgovernance and professional public administration.It lives on, however, because it provides somethingof value to people. No society is so ‘advanced’ thatit relies exclusively on de jure institutions to run itscommon affairs. For all their drawbacks, informalpatron-client exchanges are expedient means to getthings done.Clientelism evolves and adapts to the formalgovernance system, similar to what happens in theeconomic sphere. In fact, individuals who holdthe formal levers of power are often also head uppatronage networks. Political openness, widespreadpolitical participation and the emergence of broadprogrammeme that help people regardless of theirpersonal affiliations are ways ‘clientelism’ can bepushed back to benefit the poor (Brinkerhoff andGoldsmith 2005). But this is a struggle. Patrons do304
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Makingthe LawWork forEveryoneCopyri
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In reply to its expression of sorro
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group chaired by Commission members
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so that their informal contracts ha
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Table of contentsChapter 1 Access t
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Reforming Rules Regarding Bearers a
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The Economics of Informality and th
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Taking Microcredit Out of the Ghett
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5.6 Empowerment Domain 1: Access to
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1. IntroductionThe Commission on Le
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Theoretical perspectives that infor
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long-term migrant or refugee popula
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digital camera that could be used t
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or social services fraud. Thus, alt
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3. Strategies to CreateAffordable,
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is secured through social pressure
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sufficient guidance as to the best
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even better, by showing the ones wi
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A related option is teaching the po
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some other trusted service provider
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From an economic perspective this s
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2007). Such mechanisms prove prefer
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can play an important role in mobil
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motives — such as the desire to m
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of some legal action brought by the
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ernments may consider to remove art
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sations may make better decisions a
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ence others in the supply chain to
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ing access to justice for disadvant
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ardisation and simplification) and
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ary or informal systems, may improv
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Box 2 Coping with Legal Pluralism i
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cies (including local authorities)
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(ADB 2001b). These and other exampl
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e restructured in a way that reduce
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impact of a proposed action on some
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5. Conclusions andRecommendationsIn
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Chapter 1 Endnotes1 Excellent recen
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Lopez-de-Silanes, F. 2002. The Poli
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ChapterTWOEmpowering thePoor Throug
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the West, but that has made entire
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and insurance — to facilitate tra
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Table 1 Mapping the dynamics of leg
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creasing finance for land reform an
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I. IntroductionAs these lines are b
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contributed to its substance. But a
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sis to protect transactions or to p
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in their countries is added reason
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is concentrated in the hands of the
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property, contribute to the exclusi
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There may be sound policy reasons f
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system as a system of rules regardi
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Box 3 Namibian land reformIn Namibi
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Box 4 Focus AfricaCustomary rights
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property, some indigenous peoples a
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• Where consensus is hard to obta
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and the establishment of transparen
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which develop into a fully serviced
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Box 5 Sale of land: examples oflega
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as collateral more of the poor woul
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Enhancing Access to Land and Real P
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Box 8 Example of Singapore:public h
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Box 10 Slum upgradinginitiative in
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2. Pay Attention to Sequencing. The
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Foster Coalitions of Change in Favo
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Chapter 2 EndnotesUniversal Declara
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ers, refl ecting the allocation of
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ing industry through the scheme. (S
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193 See Tomlinson 2007.194 UN-ESCAP
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presented at the National Workshop
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Property Rights.’ At: http://www.
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Empowerment, issue 2, Oslo: 65-90.R
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ChapterTHREETowards a GlobalSocial
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and grounded in conditions of freed
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voluntary code-of-conduct initiativ
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outside their protective reach. The
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and sustainable solutions and peopl
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Segmentation in the Informal Labour
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Informalisation of Labour MarketsTh
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pation worldwide has given rise to
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through a variety of legal instrume
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Box 4 Social case for labourregulat
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Box 5 ILO Conventions and Recommend
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provision of full, productive, free
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Labour Conference in 1996, in recog
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different paths to enforcement, wit
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Table 1 Mean Measures of Regulation
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However, a more detailed examinatio
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countries this translates into unem
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legislative changes, it will critic
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6. Principles and practicesof Labou
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The Homeless People’s Federation
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Conclusions for national strategies
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tions and responsive mechanisms tha
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ticularly the prohibition of forced
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Annex 1:Recent and current initiati
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the following four-fold test: ‘(1
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Nations, the ILO and the World Bank
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able to go beyond general statement
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Case 8:Minimum Living Standard Secu
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Case 11:China’s positive response
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er, perhaps even prepaid, to ease t
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48 Including the UN funds, programm
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the Formal Economy and Informal Reg
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131—182.Sabel, C., D. O’Rourke,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY‘The opposite of
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vast majority earn their living in
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and economic activity. First, in or
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ment procurement, tax rebates, and
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developing countries, however, info
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of the provision of adequate infras
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preneurs and small sector enterpris
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negative manifestations of informal
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million persons and their dependent
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within which business operates offe
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developed countries. In 1998, women
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four percent employed in the public
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3.Business Rights:Unlocking Barrier
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Street VendorsCommon issues and cha
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Box 3 Most Difficult Places toDo Bu
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Case Study:Ukraine and Private Busi
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The Chart below captures broadly th
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in helping the poor create wealth.
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tively unknown markets that require
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Case Study:Linking Markets: Promoti
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micro-finance activities. Micro-fin
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Remittances — the transfer of fun
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Case Study:Durban: A Heterogeneous
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5. Institutional changesand legal t
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step toward this kind of structure.
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key topics in simple and clear lang
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oped as part of a long-term regulat
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cured creditors have priority to th
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Page 275 and 276: Case Study:Identity, Voice, and Ass
Page 277 and 278: 6. Pursuing the agenda forchangeOve
Page 279 and 280: Case Study:Technology and the Infor
Page 281 and 282: is not the aim to diminish the enor
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Page 287 and 288: Recommendations and Key MessagesObj
Page 289 and 290: Chapter 4 Endnotes1 A business has
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Page 296 and 297: ChapterFIVERoad Maps forImplementat
Page 298 and 299: Following the contextual analysis
Page 300 and 301: establish a ‘legal empowerment pr
Page 302 and 303: targeted indicators endorsed by nat
Page 304 and 305: 1. Introduction: Attributesof Legal
Page 306 and 307: 2. Implementation:Challenges andOpp
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Page 310 and 311: Figure 5.2 Influences on Policy Imp
Page 312 and 313: Table 5.2 Illustrative Stakeholder
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Page 328 and 329: Box 5.5 Authority Systems: Land Rig
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Page 334 and 335: Table 5.4 Skeleton Diagnostic Tool:
Page 336 and 337: 3.Roadmaps toImplementationReforms
Page 338 and 339: Table 5.5 Country Specific Implemen
Page 340 and 341: Table 5.7 Empowerment Domain 2: Pro
Page 342 and 343: Table 5.8 Empowerment Domain 3: Lab
Page 344 and 345: Table 5.10 LEP Implementation Strat
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Page 348 and 349: Box 5.7 Land Sector Harmonisation,
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Page 352 and 353: Table 5.12 A Framework for a Demand
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Page 356 and 357: 4.Bring existing technical solution
Page 358 and 359: Annex 1: PolicyImplementation Tools
Page 360: MIS: A Management Information Syste
Page 363 and 364: Training (on leadership, group work
Page 365: of labour disputes: An internationa
Page 368 and 369: on whether patent and copyright pro
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Ouchi, Fumika. 2004. Twinning as a
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