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ing PIL suits to effect broader legal change orinstitutional reform. PIL has played a significantrole in the strategy of social reform movementsin South Asia and South Africa in particular, andit is increasingly common in other parts of theworld as well (NCLEP India 2007, Dembrowski2000, Gloppen 2005, Hershkoff and McCrutcheon2000). The distinction between oversightlitigation and PIL is more a matter of degree thana difference in kind. Oversight litigation moreclosely resembles a traditional lawsuit alleging aprivate injury to a legally protected interest, whilePIL seeks to involve the judiciary in a more overtlylaw-making or reformist role, but in practicemany oversight suits seek institutional changes,and much PIL is directed toward the redress ofwidely-shared private grievances against bureaucraticinstitutions.Litigation is not the most desirable form of improvingadministrative accountability and bureaucraticjustice. In the first place, any strategy thatrelies on litigation and judicial review is likelyto be expensive and time-consuming. ‘Retail’administrative lawsuits may also put an enormousburden on the court system. For example,in many Latin American countries citizens whobelieve they have been wrongly denied a governmentbenefit can file an amparo claim directlyin the civil courts, thereby circumventing the administrativereview process. These amparo claimsclog the courts, and because they are focusedonly on the individual claim they tend not to addressthe root cause of bureaucratic failure.Secondly, courts may lack the expertise neededto understand the complex, technical issues thatoften arise in administrative law or institutionalreform cases. Judges, however, may overestimatetheir own competence in such matters. Somecountries have attempted to address this problemby establishing specialised administrative courts,but even in these cases judges are at a comparativedisadvantage compared to other institutionswhen considering issues of bureaucratic institutionaldesign.Finally, some observers have raised the concernthat well-intentioned reformers, especially thosewith elite legal backgrounds, may be seducedby the appeal of litigation as a vehicle of socialchange and pursue this strategy at the expenseof more valuable — but less visible and exciting— political organisation, lobbying, and education.The three concerns cited are all valid, and litigationshould generally not be the first line ofdefence (or offence) in dealing with an abusive,unaccountable, or underperforming bureaucracy.Nevertheless, having available litigation as aweapon of last resort may be vital in making theother mechanisms of bureaucratic justice functioneffectively. The principles that should applyto both to administrative oversight litigationand to PIL are the same as those discussed inthe context of access to legal justice generally:reformers should work to eliminate failures inthe market for legal services and litigation, andestablish institutions that allocate scarce judicialresources to the cases where judicial interventionis most necessary and appropriate. Thus, desirableapproaches may include broadening rulesof standing, adopting one-way fee-shifting rules,facilitating representative or collective lawsuits,and targeting scarce legal aid resources at casesthat affect large numbers of people, while at thesame time reformer should provide more optionsand resources for non-judicial relief of administrativedisputes, and should require exhaustionof administrative remedies as a precondition forjudicial review.55