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ers, refl ecting the allocation of lands. Second, water user associationswere formed and a community-managed water provision system, a watercharge collection mechanism, and maintenance of the intra-farmwater distribution system were established. Third, a grant of US$300per hectare was provided to farmers to obtain crop inputs or any farmneeds to start farming as an independent family farmer. Fourth, technicalassistance was provided to farmers by using demonstration plots.In Tajikistan the government owns the land, but its use right is vestedwith the Tajik citizen, family, individual, or group of individuals. Theland use right is inheritable but this right cannot be rented, leased,transferred to non-family members, mortgaged, or sold. The land useright is registered and is backed by the government. In the case of theFPSP, land tenure rights are now vested with the farmer; in case of formerprivatisation programmes, land use rights are collective, with thefarm manager making decisions on behalf of the members. This differenceresults in different incentive structures and differential impacts ofindividual land tenure and collective land tenure on the incentives forand incomes of farmers. Sattar and Mohib 2007: 463-465.80 Alden Wily 2006.81 See Mendoza 2006.82 Izumi 2007: 14.83 Bruce et al. 2006: 47-51.84 Alden Wily and Mbaya 2001; Alden Wily 2003; Alden Wily 2006 passim.85 Hardin 1968.86 Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994; Mighot-Adholla et al. 1994a; Collierand Gunning 1999.87 Alden Wily 2006.88 Alden Wily 2002.89 Bruce and Migto-Adholla 1994; Deininger 2003; Augustinus 2003.90 Alden Wily 2002, 2006b, 2006c.91 Deininger et al. 2007.92 See Bruce et al. 2006: 107-142.93 CLEP Kenya; CLEP Pakistan; CLEP Philippines; CLEP Uganda.94 Field 2004.95 Deininger and Chamorro 2004; Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994; Jacobyand Minten 2005.96 Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994; Feder and Nishio 1996.97 Feder, Onchan and Raparia 1988; Galiani and Schargrodsky 200498 In Cambodia, people pay US$200 to $300 and more in informalfees for title to land in urban areas. See World Bank 2002: 7.99 Augustinus 2003: 25.100 Palmer 1998: 87.101 Burns 2006: 3.102 In Mexico, ‘some ejidos prefer not to regularize the land for humansettlements to evade paying the land tax, which obviously promotes informalityin land markets’ (UN-Habitat 2005a: 107). A similar outcomeis reported from Pakistan, reinforcing the need for taxes to be set ataffordable levels and for the revenue to fi nance services people wantand are willing to pay for (Payne 1997: 8).103 In Indonesia, property tax reform increased revenues under reducedadministrative and compliance costs. Careful introduction of thechanges minimized resistance. Political will was a paramount requirement.Although there were pre-existing property taxes, dramatic adjustmentswere required to deliver the changes. These were carefully pilotedto test and improve procedures, to train staff and identify taxpayerresponses to the changes. Indonesia’s tertiary educational institutionsnow train about 600 property tax administrators a year. Colombia’s useof the self-assessment method has resulted in an increased tax baseand revenues and has allowed the cadastre to be updated. In Kenya, theprimary obstacles to property tax reform have been lack of political willand weak administration. Taxpayers need to perceive the linkage withimproved local services and also need to be confi dent of fair administration.For an overview see Bird and Slack 2002104 Condominium is another form of housing tenure. It is the legalterm used in the United States and in most provinces of Canada for atype of joint ownership of real property in which portions of the propertyare commonly owned and other portions are individually owned. In Australiaand the Canadian province of British Columbia, the legal term forthis is ‘strata title’. In Quebec, it is known as syndicates of co-ownership.In the United Kingdom, the equivalent is commonhold, but thisform of ownership was only introduced in 2004.105 See Deininger et al. 2007.106 See e.g. Payne 2002; Durand-Lasserve 2003.107 See Galiani and Schargrodsky 2004. The authors study a naturalexperiment whereby land titling was ex post granted to a large group ofindividual squatters. The analysis reveals marked changes in economicresponses of this group relatively to the controlled group of squatters.The study shows only modest positive effect of land titling on accessto mortgage credit, and no impact on access to other forms of credit.It shows no effect on the labour income of the households holding newtitles. However, it is shown that moving a poor household from uncertainusufructuary rights to a more complete bundle of property rightssubstantially increased investment in the family houses. Land titlingreduced the size of families. These smaller families invested more inthe education of their children. In sum, entitling the poor increases theirinvestment both in the house and in the human capital of their children.This is a very concrete example of legal empowerment with positive longterm effects. Property rights contribute to human development under anintergenerational and behavioural perspective.108 On Africa see a series of reports by IIED at: http://www.iied.org/NR/drylands/projects/landregistration.html109 Ejido land in Mexico, which can be transformed into fully alienablefreehold land based on a qualifi ed vote by the assembly, is a goodexample. The fact that only about a tenth of ejidos chose to go this routeillustrates that, even at high levels of per capita income, many userssee benefi ts from maintaining communal relations to be greater thanthose from full individualisation of rights.110 Cotula 2007111 ‘Land Tenure Reform and Gender Equality,’ UNRISD Researchand Policy Brief 4 (January, 2006) 1. In most Indian states the patta,or leasehold right over government land occupied by the poor is givenjointly in the name of the husband and wife. In Andhra Pradesh, thepatta is in the name of women only. There have not been any studies on117
the outcomes or impacts of this practice. Banerjee 1999..112 UN-HABITAT 2006; Strickland 2004.113 Deere and Leon 2003.114 UN-HABITAT 2006.115 Agarwal 1994: 272.116 Drawn from Baechtold 2006.117 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of June 5, 1992, http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp118 http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/tk/920/wipo_pub_920.pdf119 http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/laws/pdf/suigeneris_folklore.pdf120 http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_9/wipo_grtkf_ic_9_inf_4.pdf121 For related aspects of bureaucratic justice for the poor see Chapter1, Section 3.122 Ibid.123 CLEP Indonesia; CLEP Sri Lanka: 27; CLEP Philippines.124 In Peru, reforms, particularly those that required congressionalapproval of laws, were promoted with the active participation of beneficiaries.The proposal to modify the Civil Code to permit the administrative,rather than judicial, declaration of adverse possession wasmet with a political debate based on different academic positions. Tothe extent to which the defi nition depended on a legislative option andrequired political support, COFOPRI disseminated the reform proposalamong the leaders of the settlements who would benefit from it and facilitatedthe organisation of the leadership to defend the reform proposalsbefore Congress. A group of leaders lobbied members of Congress ofdiverse political sectors in order to demonstrate that the reforms wouldbenefi t more than 100,000 families only in Lima, which was incentiveenough to obtain congressional approval.125 Through the intervention of COFOPRI it was determined that theleaders would work with the technical staff of the institution to obtainthe technical and legal information needed to carry out the requiredactions. In this stage legal obstacles to the regularisation of propertyin favour of its occupants would be identifi ed, such as cases of privateproperty, archaeological land, or in a risk zone. The participationof leaders enabled the settlers to appreciate the diffi culties that COFO-PRI confronted in regularising properties, made their expectations morerealistic regarding the time required to conclude the delivery of titlingservices, and made them aware about the need for reforms and complementaryactions.126 In Peru, COFOPRI developed the capacity to continuously improvereforms through a series of incremental changes based on a learningby-doingapproach. The drafting of new laws was linked to formalisationprocesses (0, 1 and 2) which ensured that experiences and lessonslearned at the fi eld level were incorporated into the normative framework.For example, as the formalisation process advanced, COFOPRI,through inputs from fi eld staff and community representatives, uncoverednew forms of informality that were not identifi ed in the pilot project,like ‘pueblos tradicionales’ (ancient informal settlements in Arequipa).COFOPRI and RPU worked together to develop legally sound and effi cientsolutions to these problems. New procedures were developed and testedat the organisational level and once validated, incorporated into thelegal framework.127 See FAO 2007. For general issues of public administration reformsee Chapter 1, Section 3.128 Also recommended in CLEP Philippines, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda,Indonesia, Tanzania, Sri Lanka.129 See Chapter 1, passim.130 Center of Advanced Study 2007: 122.131 World Bank, World Development Report 2002: 14.132 Computerising records in the Indian state of Karnataka undera PPP model is estimated to have saved users US$16 million in bribes(Lobo and Balakrishnan 2002). Automating registration and the associatedland valuation allowed outsourcing to the private sector whichsignifi cantly improved access and resulted in cuts in stamp duty from14 percent to 8 percent while quadrupling tax revenue from US$120 toUS$480 million.133 See Prahalad 2005: 87-88.134 See FAO 2007: 25. See e.g. CLEP Uganda, Grassroots Academy,Property Section; CLEP Ethiopia (p.11 ss.) analyses how the current landsystem with state ownership gives the state (i.e. the individuals controllingthe state) immense power over peasants.135 Fernandes 2006.136 FAO 2007: 50.137 The Singapore urban planning experience demonstrates that giventhe will and effi ciency of implementation, it is possible to plan aheadand promote organised growth. The unauthorized settlements of Delhi,India, that are regularised in the late 1970s offer another example.These settlements have seen signifi cant improvement following regularisationdue to implementation of layout plans and extension of civicservices by government agencies. Residents there have come to acquirefull tenurial security, resulting in their making further investments atindividual and community levels and improving the quality of the microenvironment.In Malaysia, the government sets a ceiling price for lowcost housing, at RM25,000 per unit for people with household income ofless than RM750 per month and requires the private sector to constructlow cost housing (30 percent quota provision) in every residential development.These urban planning efforts need to be made more widelyreplicated at the community and city level. Yuen 2002, 2004, 2005.138 Jacobs 1961; Newman 1972.139 Barzel 1997; Alexander 2001.140 Steuteville 2005; Congress for the New Urbanism 1999.141 CLEP Report from South America (Brazil).142 Santiago 2004.143 Banerjee 2005.144 Government of India 1998.145 Government of India 1998.146 An external evaluation of the scheme showed that the 2,800families have improved their housing situation considerably and haveorganised themselves to procure infrastructure incrementally. 600families have been gainfully employed in the home-based carpet weav-118
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Makingthe LawWork forEveryoneCopyri
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In reply to its expression of sorro
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group chaired by Commission members
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so that their informal contracts ha
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Table of contentsChapter 1 Access t
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Reforming Rules Regarding Bearers a
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The Economics of Informality and th
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Taking Microcredit Out of the Ghett
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5.6 Empowerment Domain 1: Access to
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1. IntroductionThe Commission on Le
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Theoretical perspectives that infor
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long-term migrant or refugee popula
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digital camera that could be used t
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or social services fraud. Thus, alt
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3. Strategies to CreateAffordable,
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is secured through social pressure
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sufficient guidance as to the best
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even better, by showing the ones wi
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A related option is teaching the po
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some other trusted service provider
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From an economic perspective this s
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2007). Such mechanisms prove prefer
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can play an important role in mobil
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motives — such as the desire to m
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of some legal action brought by the
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ernments may consider to remove art
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sations may make better decisions a
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ence others in the supply chain to
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ing access to justice for disadvant
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ardisation and simplification) and
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ary or informal systems, may improv
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Box 2 Coping with Legal Pluralism i
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cies (including local authorities)
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(ADB 2001b). These and other exampl
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e restructured in a way that reduce
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impact of a proposed action on some
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5. Conclusions andRecommendationsIn
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Chapter 1 Endnotes1 Excellent recen
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Lopez-de-Silanes, F. 2002. The Poli
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ChapterTWOEmpowering thePoor Throug
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the West, but that has made entire
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Page 94 and 95: I. IntroductionAs these lines are b
Page 96 and 97: contributed to its substance. But a
Page 98 and 99: sis to protect transactions or to p
Page 100 and 101: in their countries is added reason
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Page 104 and 105: property, contribute to the exclusi
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Page 108 and 109: system as a system of rules regardi
Page 110 and 111: Box 3 Namibian land reformIn Namibi
Page 112 and 113: Box 4 Focus AfricaCustomary rights
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Page 116 and 117: • Where consensus is hard to obta
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Page 122 and 123: Box 5 Sale of land: examples oflega
Page 124 and 125: as collateral more of the poor woul
Page 126 and 127: Enhancing Access to Land and Real P
Page 128 and 129: Box 8 Example of Singapore:public h
Page 130 and 131: Box 10 Slum upgradinginitiative in
Page 132 and 133: 2. Pay Attention to Sequencing. The
Page 134 and 135: Foster Coalitions of Change in Favo
Page 136 and 137: Chapter 2 EndnotesUniversal Declara
Page 140 and 141: ing industry through the scheme. (S
Page 142 and 143: 193 See Tomlinson 2007.194 UN-ESCAP
Page 144 and 145: presented at the National Workshop
Page 146 and 147: Property Rights.’ At: http://www.
Page 148 and 149: Empowerment, issue 2, Oslo: 65-90.R
Page 150 and 151: ChapterTHREETowards a GlobalSocial
Page 152: and grounded in conditions of freed
Page 155 and 156: voluntary code-of-conduct initiativ
Page 157 and 158: outside their protective reach. The
Page 159 and 160: and sustainable solutions and peopl
Page 161 and 162: Segmentation in the Informal Labour
Page 163 and 164: Informalisation of Labour MarketsTh
Page 165 and 166: pation worldwide has given rise to
Page 167 and 168: through a variety of legal instrume
Page 169 and 170: Box 4 Social case for labourregulat
Page 171 and 172: Box 5 ILO Conventions and Recommend
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Page 175 and 176: Labour Conference in 1996, in recog
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Page 179 and 180: Table 1 Mean Measures of Regulation
Page 181 and 182: However, a more detailed examinatio
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The Homeless People’s Federation
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Conclusions for national strategies
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tions and responsive mechanisms tha
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ticularly the prohibition of forced
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Annex 1:Recent and current initiati
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the following four-fold test: ‘(1
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Nations, the ILO and the World Bank
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able to go beyond general statement
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Case 8:Minimum Living Standard Secu
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Case 11:China’s positive response
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er, perhaps even prepaid, to ease t
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48 Including the UN funds, programm
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the Formal Economy and Informal Reg
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131—182.Sabel, C., D. O’Rourke,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY‘The opposite of
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vast majority earn their living in
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and economic activity. First, in or
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ment procurement, tax rebates, and
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developing countries, however, info
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of the provision of adequate infras
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preneurs and small sector enterpris
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negative manifestations of informal
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million persons and their dependent
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within which business operates offe
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developed countries. In 1998, women
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four percent employed in the public
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3.Business Rights:Unlocking Barrier
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Street VendorsCommon issues and cha
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Box 3 Most Difficult Places toDo Bu
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Case Study:Ukraine and Private Busi
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The Chart below captures broadly th
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in helping the poor create wealth.
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tively unknown markets that require
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Case Study:Linking Markets: Promoti
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micro-finance activities. Micro-fin
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Remittances — the transfer of fun
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Case Study:Durban: A Heterogeneous
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5. Institutional changesand legal t
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step toward this kind of structure.
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key topics in simple and clear lang
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oped as part of a long-term regulat
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cured creditors have priority to th
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• Access to improved skills and t
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Case Study:Identity, Voice, and Ass
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6. Pursuing the agenda forchangeOve
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Case Study:Technology and the Infor
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is not the aim to diminish the enor
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in risky environments — in urban
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accepted customary forms could mean
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Recommendations and Key MessagesObj
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Chapter 4 Endnotes1 A business has
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than the rich. It further demonstra
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______., ‘Ghana Decent Work Pilot
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ChapterFIVERoad Maps forImplementat
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Following the contextual analysis
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establish a ‘legal empowerment pr
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targeted indicators endorsed by nat
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1. Introduction: Attributesof Legal
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2. Implementation:Challenges andOpp
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nature need to be rewritten or abol
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Figure 5.2 Influences on Policy Imp
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Table 5.2 Illustrative Stakeholder
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effective land control does not nec
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actors and assuming they will behav
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cymakers must tailor their empowerm
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ut some community members report be
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efore taking on implementation, or
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Table 5.3. Political Administrative
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not give up their position willingl
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Box 5.5 Authority Systems: Land Rig
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Afinal source of complexity is that
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almost always have the upper hand b
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Table 5.4 Skeleton Diagnostic Tool:
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3.Roadmaps toImplementationReforms
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Table 5.5 Country Specific Implemen
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Table 5.7 Empowerment Domain 2: Pro
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Table 5.8 Empowerment Domain 3: Lab
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Table 5.10 LEP Implementation Strat
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plans, poverty reduction strategies
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Box 5.7 Land Sector Harmonisation,
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quality and utility in establishing
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Table 5.12 A Framework for a Demand
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Empowerment of the poor in the end
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4.Bring existing technical solution
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Annex 1: PolicyImplementation Tools
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MIS: A Management Information Syste
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Training (on leadership, group work
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of labour disputes: An internationa
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on whether patent and copyright pro
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oads — cover only a limited numbe
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28 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/gender/ge
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Ouchi, Fumika. 2004. Twinning as a
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