Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

112 Darrell SliderPutin’s new powers to appoint governors, while 27 per cent were opposedand 28 per cent had difficulty answering. (The poll also found that 51 percent supported as candidates people from the region, even if they lackedmanagement skills, while 37 per cent would support a candidate with provenskills from outside the region). 24 A more independent polling body, thePublic Opinion Foundation (FOM), found in September 2004 that 37 percent of respondents expected negative consequences from presidentialappointments, while 28 per cent expected a positive outcome. 25 ByDecember 2004, when the new law was adopted, 36 per cent foresaw morepositive consequences from presidential appointees, while 29 per cent expectednegative consequences. 26 Attitudes become somewhat more negativeduring the first year of implementation. FOM reported in November 2005that 34 per cent approved the presidential appointment process while 36 percent disapproved. 27The constitutionality of Putin’s new policy was in dispute as well. The1993 constitution was vague on issue of how organs of power are formed,since it predated most elections of regional executives. Nevertheless, theconstitution gave regions the right to ‘form their own organs of state power’and placed the formation of these organs exclusively in the hands of theregions; it was not in the list of functions to be shared jointly by federal andregional levels. In December 2005 the Constitutional Court upheld the legalityof Putin’s new procedures in response to a challenge by a voter fromTyumen' oblast that was joined by the Union of Right Forces. 28 The courtargued that the constitution should be interpreted ‘in the socio-historicalcontext which is developing’ and that the president, as ‘direct representativeof all of the people’, could add to his constitutional powers simply by thepassage of a law. 29 In other words, the Constitutional Court gave Putin freereign to interpret the constitution ‘creatively’.The new system in practiceThe new process by which governors were appointed was far from transparent.A direct role in the choice of candidates was supposed to be played bythe presidential representative (in Russian abbreviated as polpred) in thefederal districts. 30 They were required to provide the presidential administrationwith the names of at least two candidates for the top post at leastninety days before a governor’s term expired. The Kremlin’s role in the processappeared decisive, in fact determining who would be on the ‘short list’of candidates to be considered—and often deciding in advance who wouldbe the ultimate winner. The presidential representative not only was sometimesexcluded from this process, but at times was the last to find out aboutthe Kremlin’s choice. 31 A former governor, Sergei Sobyanin of Tyumen'oblast, was named head of the presidential administration in November2005. Reports suggest that the decisive role in determining the preferredcandidate for regional executives was played by the deputy head of the