Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

74 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderHahn’s argument sounds ‘unconventional’ by portraying past authoritarianismas a source of stability whereas Putin’s alleged ‘democratization’ is seenas a potential source of instability. By implication one could assume thatauthoritarian ethnic federalism provides stability, whereas an equalization ofthe regional status and ‘democratization’ Putin-style holds the prospect ofethnic mobilization and instability. However, Hahn’s argument is flawed in atleast three ways. First, it associates authoritarianism with stability. Yet, theauthoritarian rule in the ethnic regions is inherently unstable, because it isexclusive, dependent on the continuous provision of clientelistic favours, andit feeds corruption, extractive behaviour and kleptocratic rule. Second, Hahnidentifies Putin’s recentralization with democratization, particularly due tothe expected increase in voter mobilization – an unfounded postulation,because with the nomination of governors, the most meaningful elections inthe regions were abolished. Third, the argument implicitly repeats the old,empirically unproven claim that democracy is impossible in divided societies.59 However, Hahn might be correct with his prediction that Putin’s recentralizationsparks a revival of ethnic mobilization and especiallyIslamism.The imposition of uniform rules under Putin’s presidency could be interpretedas a strengthening of the rule of law and of checks and balances. Theargument in favour of re-centralization ultimately holds that only a singleauthoritative centre providing for rule of law, effective state administration,and determining the competencies and functions of the state could create theprerequisites of democratization. 60 However, the empirical record of morethan five years of re-centralization does not confirm the expected strengtheningof the rule of law, neither in terms of local self-government nor interms of a protection of individual rights by the federal envoys acting asmonitors and policy coordinators on Putin’s behalf. 61Putin’s re-centralization is based on the assumption that democracy andfederalism are mutually exclusive. However, the substitution of regionallybased authoritarianism by direct rule over the regions is unlikely to becomea panacea for authoritarianism and ethnocracy. As Filippov and Shvetsovanote, it is not only ‘fundamentally inconsistent with democratic competition’but ‘equally inconsistent with the non-democratic political competitionwhich, even if democracy is abandoned, will arise sooner or later’. 62 InSoviet times centralism and authoritarian integration only functioned aslong as the centre could enforce its policy and influence sub-national policywith ideological levers. Given the low degree of incorporation of non-Russian elites into the central government it is unlikely that non-Russiangroups will in toto abandon their aspirations for self-preservation and territorialrepresentation. Great-power chauvinism and xenophobia amongethnic Russians and parts of the Moscow elite may additionally estrangenon-Russians and lead, at least in parts, to radicalization instead of thepluralistic sentiments or assimilation that prevailed in the first post-Sovietdecade.