Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

Federal discourses, minority rights, and conflict transformation 69state of affairs in federal relations. The sample is small and cannot claim tobe representative for all ethnic regions or ethnic groups. Non-Russian regionaldeputies were chosen because they were more likely to have views differentfrom ethnic Russian politicians in the centre, although no comparisonwas undertaken. Two republics from the North Caucasus were chosen inorder to assess whether the dominant perception of a special intensity ofconflicts in the North Caucasus was reflected in the answers. In contrast torepresentatives of ethnic associations it could be assumed that the deputiesrepresent their constituencies and have some knowledge of the federal institutions.Equally, in contrast to executive representatives dependent on thePresident, it was assumed that regional deputies are relatively more autonomousin expressing their views. Since the willingness to answer depended onthe assurance of anonymity, no questions on biographical background wereposed.When asked how they generally assess Putin’s reforms, a mixed pictureemerged. Out of thirty-one respondents, only four had an explicitly positiveview of Putin’s reforms – they had strengthened the ‘power vertical’, andadditionally some of their effect would not show immediately. The mostvocal critique of Putin’s reform came from the Bashkir deputies. The deputiesfrom Kabardino-Balkariya, on the other hand, appreciated Putin’s leadershipcapabilities and his military reforms. Some respondents paint amulti-coloured picture – the ‘harmonization’ of central and regional legislationis seen as positive, but not the abolition of elections to become governor.There is criticism that corruption and incompetence increased while theseven federal districts have by and large been unsuccessful.Meanwhile, direct contacts with the central government have simplybecome more difficult. The centre had taken away almost all taxes from theregions, it is criticized, whilst none of Putin’s reforms were carried through:for example, the local self-government was not advanced. The monetarizationof welfare is very often sharply criticized. It is apparent that the absenceof open resistance to Putin’s reforms is not identical with approval; protectedby anonymity, a high degree of dissatisfaction is expressed.Do the non-Russian deputies, their respective republic and their peopleenjoy an equal access to the political system? The questions were aimed atthe perceived discrimination or non-discrimination and the responsiveness ofthe political system. Roughly one third (10 out of 31) – mostly fromKabardino-Balkariya – stressed the possibility of initiating federal legislationby regional legislature, the representation of the republic and one’s ownethnic groups in the State Duma and the Federation Council as well as inpolitical parties. Two more highlighted the general possibility of representingethnic and republican interests, but saw deficits in the actual implementation.The overwhelming majority of the respondents (19 out of 31) think that theethnic regions are circumnavigated by the central government, that the city ofMoscow would be preferred, and that access under Putin had deteriorated.The centre would not take regional authorities into account; the so-called