Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

Putin and the election of regional governors 113administration, Vladislav Surkov, and the presidential aide responsible forpersonnel, Viktor Ivanov. 32 Candidates on the short list were usually broughtto the Kremlin for interviews, including an interview with Putin.Rather than accept that the previous popular elections meant that sittinggovernors should remain in office to the end of their terms, a procedure wasestablished that allowed governors to seek a ‘vote of confidence’ from Putinthat could lead to reappointment. Behind the scenes bargains were struckbetween governors and the Kremlin on when would be an appropriate timeto ask for reappointment. In most cases, the public announcement that agovernor would seek reappointment meant that the issue had already beendecided.Regional legislators were presented with Putin’s choice by the polpred andoften had the opportunity to discuss the options in advance with the presidentialrepresentative. In February 2007 Putin reported that for severalregions, which he did not name, ‘I had to change my initial opinion whendeputies of the legislative assembly said “We respect you … even love you,but we will not vote for the potential candidate who you want to propose.”’33 One of these cases was undoubtedly that of Nizhnii Novgorod,where Putin was prepared to reappoint as governor Gennadii Khodyrev.Khodyrev had long ago dropped his communist affiliation and had joinedUnited Russia. His reappointment was strongly opposed, though, by thepresidential representative, Sergei Kirienko, and a majority in the regionalassembly. 34Once Putin nominated his choice from the candidates presented to him,the process worked in a way that he would describe as ‘effektivnyi’—in everycase Putin’s choice has been endorsed on the first vote and nearly unanimouslyin every case. In this, Putin has been aided by the increasing dominancein the regions of the political party United Russia. By the end of2006, United Russia had a majority of seats in the assemblies of two-thirdsof Russian regions.Another factor that helped many governors retain their posts was theproblem of where to find people to take their places. Unlike the CentralCommittee of the CPSU, the Kremlin had no cadre reserve system for officialsat this level. And, as some joked at the time, there simply weren’tenough Leningrad KGB officers from the 1970s (a key component of Putin’sinner circle) to fill eighty-nine regional posts. An alternative approach fordetermining candidates was suggested by the dominant Russian politicalparty, United Russia. It proposed a new procedure which would give theparty that ‘won’ regional elections to the legislature the right to suggest thecandidate. The assembly would then vote on whether to submit the candidacyto the president. The president would then review the selection andformally nominate the candidate to the legislature. Putin signed this amendmentinto law in January 2006. It begs the question, though, of how decisionsare made in the party that wins. If that party happens to be UnitedRussia, the decision is in fact made by the party’s central leadership, which