Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

The problem of effective representation 169resources. Thus, on the one hand, regional power was not ‘hijacked’ by asingle business group (as was the case in some regions with a mono-structuredregional economy). On the other hand, the regional administration did nothave direct control over the regional economy (unlike Tatarstan andBashkortostan, for instance). The situation changed when in 2000 Igumnovlost the gubernatorial election to Trutnev, who had been serving as mayor ofPerm. By that time, however, most of the region’s economic resources hadbeen distributed, and that made Trutnev take account of the interests of adiverse set of other powerful elites in the Oblast.As a whole, Perm Oblast belongs to the category of regions with heterogeneousbut non-fragmented political elites. For a number of reasons theseelite groups were induced to engage in cooperative activities rather than tocompetition and conflict. 41 In these conditions the regional administrationplayed an active role as a mediator (or broker) of intra-elite interests. Theregional assembly (the Perm Oblast legislature), formed in 1994, became aground for coordinating and negotiating interests between the variousgroups. As a rule, deputies tried to find a compromise, and decision-makingwas based on compromise and cooperation. Acute conflicts were rare andgradually something approaching an ‘elites settlement’ was formed.From the viewpoint of interest representation Perm Oblast is quite a typicalregion. The regional legislature consisted of forty deputies who are electedin single-member constituencies predominantly on a non-party basis. Inthe second electoral cycle (the 1997 election) only two deputies belonged to apolitical party. Four years later, in the 2001 election the number of partyaffiliateddeputies hardly changed (only three legislators had party membership).Nevertheless, several informal groups, reflecting the makeup of theregional elite, were formed in the legislature. Some of them took the form of‘deputies’ groups’. In 1997–2001 the most influential among those were the‘Industrialists of Prikamye’ (supporters of Igumnov) and the ‘Dialogue’group (those supporting Trutnev).By the beginning of the 2000s the situation had started to change. In linewith national tendencies the role of political parties became more prominent.Influential politicians started to join parties and participate in party life. In2001 a United Russia faction was created in the regional legislature, comprisingnearly half the deputies, mostly from the Industrialists of Prikamyegroup. The second party faction, the Union of Right Forces (SPS), wasformed by five legislators. In addition, four more deputies declared theiraffiliation with other parties (Yabloko, the People’s Party, CPRF and LiberalRussia). The operational practices of the Perm legislature reveal, however,that the deputies’ party affiliations do not necessarily create a party-basedmechanism of representation. Up until 2003 party discipline was weakand legislators identified themselves as independent deputies rather thanparty representatives. It is highly indicative that membership of one partyfaction did not preclude deputies from joining other factions at the sametime.