Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

202 Rostislav Turovskiicompany. This also helps to explain the election of Khloponin as Governorof Taymyr, which coincided with the restructuring of Norilsk Nikel’s assetsand the registration of the company in Taymyr. Moreover, becauseKrasnoyarsk Krai is the main region of Norilsk Nikel’s operations andTaymyr is its integral part, it was later decided to move Khloponin to theoffice of governor of the Krasnoyarsk Krai.The decisions of large businesses to promote their own candidates togubernatorial posts were rooted in the political situation in the 1990s, whichwas partially retained at the beginning of the 2000s, immediately after Putincame to power. The cases under our consideration are the ‘first wave’ ofpromotion of entrepreneurs to governors’ offices, which reached its peak in2000–2. At that time the ‘power vertical’ was not as rigid as at present, andbusiness retained some autonomy from the bureaucrats. 20 The fact thatgovernors were elected allowed them to work with the electorate independentlyof the federal centre and even to present the centre with a faitaccompli when representatives of a FIG gained power. The scope of theirauthority allowed such governors to bring real commercial benefit to theirpatron FIGs. This situation, however, changed very quickly due to the moreactive stance of the centre which was alarmed by FIGs’ desire to createpolitical footholds in the regions.Yet at present, one can speak only of marginal benefits for those FIGswhich have a representative in a governor’s office. FIGs may enter into jointprojects, be granted privileged negotiations over the budget process andregional socio-economic programmes, and gain access to valuable informationheld by the regional administration. Such companies can also use governorsas their lobbyists at the federal level, for instance, through theirmembership of the State Council which is chaired by the President.Khloponin, for example, is known to be a successful lobbyist.In this situation one can assume that it is small and medium businesses(which are affected by regional authorities to the greatest extent) that shouldbe the ones most interested in gubernatorial positions. However, the influenceof such business is usually too weak to promote its representatives intogubernatorial posts. At the same time there are serious institutional limitationsprohibiting small businesses from reaping commercial profits.The major restriction is federal policies. Putin’s centralization reforms havemade the governors more dependent on the Kremlin. Especially after abolishinggubernatorial elections and the introduction of the appointmentsystem, a governor is primarily perceived as a conductor of federal interests,as an ordinary bureaucrat operating within the limits of a prescribed mandate.Abusing one’s authority too blatantly by expanding one’s own businesscan have negative repercussions on a governor’s relations with the centre.The Kremlin tolerates it as long as it does not cause public scandals orconflicts with other power groups. However, understanding the changingrules of the game and new institutional constraints (the presidentialappointment of governors, more rigid and better organized federal control