Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

The problem of effective representation 177intra-party interaction depends on the correlation of resources and interestsof party leaders. In ‘autocratic’ regions the dominant actor usually controlsthe regional branch of United Russia, and all other parties are marginalized.In ‘competitive’ regions the situation is different. In principle, a ‘pure’ modelis possible, when the party configuration accurately reflects the makeup ofthe regional elite, but in reality there are two ways in which political practicecan deviate from such a model. On the one hand, contradictions betweenelite groups can become internalized within parties, which can cause splitswithin party organizations. On the other hand, influential actors can extendtheir control over several regional party organizations at one time.As far as the ‘vertical’ dimension is concerned, the more influential(resource-contributing) actors are involved in a regional branch of a party,the weaker is the ability of the central party leadership to maintain control.The degree of subordination varies significantly from region to region andfrom party to party. It primarily depends on the correlation of resourcesbetween the centre and its regional branch, but since parties are based onmutually beneficial exchanges of resources rather than on common politicalpreferences, weak subordination does not constitute a threat to them as longas the ‘system of personalized exchanges’ remains in place.The existing model of representation turns out to be even less effectivethan the previous one based on the ‘non-party’ mechanism, because thecircle of interests being represented is much narrower. More and more oftenelection campaigns turn into competitions of political technologies, includingthe so-called ‘black technologies’; public disillusionment is growing, which isreflected in a rise in absenteeism. This means that most of the parties inRussia lack popular legitimacy. A study of federal and regional electionsclearly demonstrates that there is a high demand in society for more universaland value-orientated parties.Appendix 7.1 Regional legislature elections resultsFirst cycleelectionsSecond cycleelectionsThird cycle electionsNo.ofseatsShareofpartydeputiesNo.ofseatsShareofpartydeputiesNo.ofseatsShareofpartydeputiesENPUnitedRussia’sshare ofvotesUnitedRussia’sshare ofseatsAdygeya 45 51.0 54 18.5 54 55.6 2.78 33.74 42.59Aginsk Buryat AO 15 13.0 15 6.7 18 88.9 1.45 67.30 77.78Altai 41 29.0 41 29.0 41 57.8 4.76 27.20 31.71Altai Krai 50 44.0 50 34.0 68 52.9 3.23 24.43 32.35Amur Oblast 30 .0 36 19.4 36 58.8 5.00 16.26 19.44Arkhangelsk Oblast 39 2.6 39 12.8 62 67.4 3.57 23.63 40.32Astrakhan Oblast 29 27.6 29 10.3 58 81.5 2.33 38.73 57.14Bashkortostan 174 .0 120 81.7 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0