Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

250 John F. Youngcentre. This is one reason why the collapses of the Tsarist and Soviet stateswere through implosion. Top-heavy administrative structures lack effectivefoundations at the local level, the proverbial giants with feet of clay.Historical perspectives encourage us to examine local government reformfrom the perspective of the priorities dominant at the point of departure.Seventeen years after the reforms of 1990 and 1991, it is tempting to forgetthat many of those reformers and politicians then engaged in creating thelegal architecture for local government were focused on dismantling a unitarysystem of power that had so dominated Soviet society. The creation andapproval of a societal model for local government was perceived to be acritical development for the emergence of civil society, public participation,and local autonomy. Local self-government, outside the reach of the stateapparatus, with a locally elected executive accountable to an elected localcouncil, was considered a bold initiative and a new foundation for a democraticstate. Meaningful public participation, responsiveness to local interests,and the division of power and authority trumped concerns for order,efficiency, or equality. That executive–legislative relations were not clearlydefined, or that the financial resources of local government did not matchtheir enumerated responsibilities, became more apparent, and more important,after the implementation of the law rather than during its drafting. 10In the aftermath of Yeltsin’s war against the Supreme Soviet in 1993, thecontext for local reform changed. Local governments were then situated intwo storms: first, in the conflict between executive and legislative bodies; andsecond, in a centrifugal storm that threatened the viability of the Russianstate. On the one hand, the federal government wanted to ensure a tighterdegree of control over executive power throughout the Federation, andsought to play a greater role in the determination of principles for local selfgovernment.On the other hand, local governments were potential allies tothe federal government in the centre–regional dynamic. Stronger local governmentwould place regional administrations between the proverbialhammer and the anvil, achieving a more effective balance of power withinthe federation. 11 While federal strategy aimed to enlist local governmentsupport against regional autonomy, Moscow proved to be a fair-weatherfriend to local government: federal–regional agreements often came at theexpense of local self-government. Additionally, local governments played animportant supporting role as a buffer against political criticism directedtowards both regional and federal governments. Politicians from these higherlevels of government could pass legislation or decrees guaranteeing varioussubsidies and social services, knowing full well that local politicians werecharged with the delivery. When the needed funds were transferred either toolate or not at all, regional and federal officials were insulated from the reaction.They could blame local politicians for the failure, maintaining some measureof credibility with the public at the expense of local deputies and mayors.Such purposes and priorities of reform are often temporary rather thanenduring. By the last years of the Yeltsin era, local government as guarantor