Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

Balance in local government reform 271was clear that any successor would need to move the state in a differentdirection. 25 In terms of the framework there are three possibilities – constitutional-bureaucratic(the Western model), absolutist-patrimonial (theThird World authoritarian regime) or bureaucratic absolutism. Putin’s modernizationproject from 2000 onwards could be seen as to move Russia awayfrom the weakness and uncertainty of constitutional patrimonialism andtowards either constitutional bureaucracy or absolutist bureaucracy Theoscillation in foreign policy in Putin’s first term between European andChinese reference points reflected this, 26 although in the first term the longtermaim of a European-style constitutional-bureaucratic model dominated,so that if absolutism were to be used, it would be a means of movingtowards the Western model. This was the basis of the alliance between economicreformers and strong state advocates that supported Putin. The argumentfor this two-stage approach would run as follows:(a) it is not possible to move from the chaos of constitutional patrimonialismdirectly to constitutional bureaucracy, as the weakness of thestate has removed the capacity to create a rule-based bureaucracy (or, byextension, a law-based Rechtstaat).(b) this transition can only be done via absolutist bureaucracy.Constitutional bureaucracy requires the rule of law, and this can only beachieved by reasserting the power of the state. Power must be re-centralized.Then, once the rules have been established and are beingobserved, power can be decentralized once again (see Figure 12.1).This would involve moving from quadrant 1 and entering quadrant 3 as aprecondition for entering the final destination, quadrant 2. In some respectsthis may be seen as the trajectory of Russia’s modernization, at least as itappeared during Putin’s first administration, absolutist bureaucracy (quadrant3) being seen as preferable to absolutist patrimonialism (quadrant 4),which would be antithetical to modernization.It would be misleading to consider quadrant 3 as a return to the SovietUnion, since absolutist bureaucracy need not imply control of the entireeconomy, only control over the political system and machinery of government.It would involve some of the form of the Soviet system, but not itsideological content. The movement from quadrant 1 to 3 may still be seen asmodernization in that it involves (at the level of federal–regional relations) a shiftfrom gemeinschaft (the informal power of quadrants 1 and 4) to gesellschaft (thelaw-based authority of quadrants 2 and 3). 27This logic is not without plausibility, although it is clear there are twopotential problems. First, the move from quadrant 1 to quadrant 3 entailsthe removal of the checks and balances that operate (however imperfectly) inquadrant 1. Second, the movement from one quadrant to another may becarried out by judicial (and legislative) means and by administrative pressure.28 If administrative pressure predominates, movement to a democratic