Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

78 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderreconfiguration of powers in favour of the regions may evolve. Yet, there isno inevitability; potential factors are the political mobilization in the regionsand a visible weakening of the central government. The causes that led to thedissolution of the Soviet Union were systematic in nature. The Soviet federationbroke apart due to the deficient societal federalism, the lack of apost-Soviet federal party system, and the inefficiency in overcoming interregionaldiscrepancies, the weakness of the centre, nationalist transitionstrategies and the unstable combination of authoritarian rule with federalism.Some of these reasons could become virulent in Russia again. Theofficial politics of history and culture, which are perceived by non-Russiansas pro-orthodox, Russo-centric and blind with respect to past repression,could further alienate non-Russians. Democratization from below, on regionalor ethnic grounds, could emerge. An increase in socio-economic disparitiescould stimulate new secessionist movements, especially in the NorthCaucasus.In formal-institutional terms Russia is no longer a federation. The sourcesof Russian federalism are nonetheless deeper than Putin’s instrumentalismseems to suggest. Putin’s centralism is institutionally unstable, characterizedby a permanent reconstruction and disrespect for constitutional principles; itrepeats the mistake of a double subordination of the defunct Soviet system;it is systematically overburdened, almost unable to learn from mistakes,extremely personalized and exposes a low degree of predictability.The autonomy and corporate self-organization of the regions is currentlyweak, and there are few veto points at the central level – this has opened awide avenue for a presidential power grab. The Russian case demonstrates thatauthoritarian regression and de-federalization are mutually supportive. Asystem with an extreme concentration of unchecked powers in the presidencyand a horizontally and vertically deficient division of powers is fundamentallyopposed to federal principles.Notes1 Gail W. Lapidus, ‘Asymmetrical federalism and state breakdown in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996, pp. 74–82; Darrell Slider, 1997, ‘Russia’smarket-distorting federalism’, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 38,1997, pp. 445–60; Steven Solnick, ‘Russia over the edge: explaining the failure ofliberal state building’, East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall),1998, pp. 70–92; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, ‘Central weakness and provincial autonomy:observations on the devolution process in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1,1999, pp. 87–106; Cameron Ross, Federalism and Democratization in Russia,Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2002.2 Paul Goble, ‘Three myths about Russian federalism’, Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty Newsline, 26 October 2004.3 Irina A. Koniukhova, Sovremennyi Rossiiski federalizm i mirovoi opyt: itogi stanovleniaa perspektivy razvitiia, Moscow: ‘Izdatel'skii dom Gorodets’, 2004.4 Nikolai Petrov, ‘The security dimension of the federal reforms’, in PeterReddaway and Robert W. Orttung (eds), The Dynamics of Russian Politics.