Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

272 Vertical or triangle?law-based state could be impeded, 29 although a purely legal approach withoutdevelopment of wider support and engagement might be too weak.A weak change coalition can prevent the values underlying the changefrom being institutionalized and normalized, leading to a return to rule bypower rather than law. 30 Anything other than an optimal balance betweenjudicial, administrative and political could, in the absence of a system ofchecks and balances, lead to slippage in the direction of absolutist patrimonialism(quadrant 2). Centralizing power without changing the principlesby which it is exercised may amount to exchanging one form of patrimonialism(differentiated) for another (integrated). This lay behind the perception(in late 2006) that the monocentric system established by PresidentPutin could, on his departure, or even earlier, revert into a polycentric systemof ‘feudal pluralism’. 31 The problem is, as before, a lack of state capacity, orrather insufficient state capacity for the strategy adopted, leading some toquestion whether the vertical hierarchical approach associated with the currentadministration is necessarily more effective than the discredited decentralizedapproach of the Yeltsin period. 32A further theoretical dimension may be provided by placing the model inthe context of the romantic–baroque distinction developed by ChunglinKwa. 33 The first quadrant implies acceptance of a degree of (baroque) complexityin the governmental system and the idea of each element and eachsituation requiring special arrangements and deals. Quadrant 4 also involvesa baroque type of complexity behind apparent unity – the type of incipientfeudalism liable to emerge in the event of a weakening of an autocraticregime. The right-hand quadrants are both, by this definition, romantic, inthat they attempt to apply an overarching rationalist conception to deal withcomplexity (quadrant 2 – although this may be seen as overlaying baroqueelements) and eliminate it altogether (quadrant 3 – which has no trace ortolerance of the baroque). The Kozak Commission may be seen as havingbeen split between these two approaches, that of creating a system to dealwith complexity and that of seeking to eliminate it. This may be seen asreflected in the choice of a dual local government system – the small settlementFigure 12.1 Robinson’s (2002) framework of state transition in Russia (notes inbrackets added)Constitutional PatrimonialismConstitutional Bureaucracy1 2(Yeltsin Era/1990s fragmentation,(Western Pluralist Rechtstaat)private oligarchs)Absolutist PatrimonialismAbsolutist Bureaucracy4 3(regional regimes, official oligarchs ) (dictatorship of law )Source: N. Robinson, Russia: A State of Uncertainty, London and New York: Routledge,2002, pp. 2–6.