Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

72 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderstating that only professionalism or merit should count. The rest made no,or contradictory, statements. The plea of the majority in favour of quotas issomewhat contradictory to the low level of perceived discrimination. Ethnicminorities, especially titular ethnic groups, should obviously be representedindependently of the demographic situation or electoral results.The deputies were also asked what type of conflict regulation for conflictsbetween ethnic regions and the federal government would be the mosteffective. The answers varied and do not demonstrate specific preferences.Answers range from personal relationships to the President over arbitration,‘legal ways’, negotiations, lobbyism, and cooperation with the presidentialenvoys – to judicial solutions in court. The deputies were further asked whichethnic conflicts they would see as the most urgent. The conflict in Chechnyaand other conflicts of inter-ethnic relations in the Caucasus (especiallybetween Ossetians and Ingushetians), Russian chauvinism, an anti-Islamichysteria, xenophobia, skinheads and religious conflicts were mentioned mostoften. One third of the respondents stress conflicts that are related to enmityagainst aliens among ethnic Russians. The deputies were especially askedwhether they saw the danger of an Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslimregions of Russia. Thirteen of the interviewees said such a danger would notexist; ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was an artificial or conscientiously exaggeratedproblem. A group of equal size felt that the problem was serious oreven very serious. The remaining interviewees felt that they could not judgethis danger, or that the ‘true Islam’ was the real danger for Putin or republicanpresidents such as Rakhimov in Bashkortostan.Finally, the deputies were asked what they expect for the future (‘five yearsfrom now’) – a stabilization or de-stabilization of their republic. Twelveinterviewees (five from Adygeya) expected a higher degree of stability in thefuture in their republic. Six respondents expected a higher degree ofinstability due, amongst other reasons, to increasing political activity, whichwould replace the current political apathy. The rest felt insecure or mentionedfactors that could influence stability (‘it depends on the centre andpresident of the republic’).In contrast to the prevailing view that Putin’s reforms are accepted, thenon-Russian deputies articulate significant disagreements. A potential dissolutionof their republic is seen as the most threatening factor. The uneaseabout Putin is nonetheless less pointed than one would expect due to thestreaky affinity of many deputies to democracy as a value in itself.9 Federalism and democracyTo understand the de-federalization process under Putin, the debate on federalismand democracy is of particular importance. Here we find two oppositeviews. One camp sees federalism as a relative of democracy. Federalismwould be a seedbed of democracy, as it would allow for more participationand accountability, stimulate civil society, add access channels for political