Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

274 Vertical or triangle?difficult it became to use traditional (i.e. more patrimonial) counters to regionalpower. In the end the most effective counterweight to a tough regional patrimonialregime may well be a strong mayoral regime. However, the reform itselfwas, through the reinforcement of rational rules, to render the establishment ormaintenance of such mayoral regimes more difficult than before.Local–regional conflictWhere Subjects of the Federation (regions or republics) operate withinquadrant 4 local government is largely or entirely subservient to the regionalauthority. 38 It would be wrong to imply that patrimonialism was more prevalentat regional level than at federal or local level. However, the more aregional authority inclined towards patrimonialism (especially of the absolutisttype) the more local authorities were likely to be under pressure. Asone senior federal official commented: ‘If the subjects of the federation hadthe power, there would be no local self-government at all.’ 39There were regions such as Vologda and Tambov where the regionaladministrations were supportive of local autonomy, but there were manyothers where local autonomy was kept to the absolute minimum. Largercities, typically regional capitals, were as a rule caught in a zero-sum strugglefor power and resources against regional heads, 40 exacerbated by the lack ofclarity between local and regional (and federal) jurisdictions.The struggle for supremacy between mayors and governors has in manyways been analogous to the power struggle between regions and the federalcentre. There is a fundamental difference, however. Although the federalcentre has often targeted individual regional heads, centre–regional tensions havetended to be manifested and mediated through collective institutions such asthe upper house of the Russian Parliament, the Federal Council (especiallyprior to 2001 when regional heads were still ex officio members of that body).Even in the late Yeltsin period, when special agreements with individual regionswere the federal authorities’ preferred method of dealing with conflict, andaccording to some the most effective, 41 it could be said that it was the collectivebargaining power of the regions as a whole that kept the federal authorities on thedefensive.Local–regional tension, by contrast, has tended to manifest itself throughindividualized conflict between governors and mayors, with usually only theregional capital involved – the pattern of Russian urbanization is such that inmost regions there is only one city substantial enough to challenge or resist theregional authority. 42 This conflict appears to be endemic to the system – somehave suggested that it would exist even under a system of appointments:Prussak (former governor of Novgorod region) got his own person electedwhen Kursunov (mayor of Novgorod city) died, but within sixmonths they were enemies. The conflict is in the structure not thepersonalities or whether they are elected or appointed. 43