Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

Federal discourses, minority rights, and conflict transformation 71Federations need, at least in theory, neutral arbiters for conflict resolution,among them a Constitutional Court. The deputies were asked whether theyperceived the rulings of the Constitutional Court on federal matters as justand fair. Only three respondents agreed unanimously with the rulings of theConstitutional court, almost half (15) responded that they did not know anyof the respective rulings, while the rest saw the Constitutional court as prejudiced,under political orders, dependent on the Kremlin or that its decisionswere not implemented. The Constitutional Court, in other words, isnot seen as an institution relevant for federal conflict resolution.With respect to the change to the Presidential nomination of governors in2004, which replaced their direct election, the deputies were asked whether anominated or an elected governor would have more influence. One third ofthe respondents (10 out of 31) support the nomination of governors by thePresident – they argue that Putin would only agree to those candidatesalready chosen by the regional legislature. Elections, by contrast, would offermore space for abuse whereas a nomination by the President would lead tofewer ‘mistakes’. The President would consult before nominating a candidate,and ultimately a governor nominated by the President would have moreinfluence. By contrast, nine deputies, equally distributed among the republics,reject the selection and confirmation by the President – only an electedregional leader would correspond to democratic norms and would feelresponsible vis-à-vis the voters. The final third is undecided – whetherthrough election or nomination, the decisive factor was the personality of thecandidate. All in all, it is remarkable that only one third of the deputies criticizedsuch a fundamental constraint on regional autonomy – a basic principleof federalism – that was caused by the abolition of gubernatorialelections. Previous disappointments with incumbents, the expected gains interms of influence, and a personalized, not institutionalized, understandingof politics, as well as the elevation of regional legislatures who have theright to confirm the President’s choice may play a role in this. It is clearthat only a minority see the election of chief executives as a democraticvalue in itself.The non-Russian deputies were asked furthermore whether they sensediscrimination by the federal government or its subdivisions. They wereasked to rank the presence or absence of such perceived discrimination on ascale from 0 to 5 (0 = absence; 5 = strong presence). The maximum valueof 5 was given by five deputies, the minimal score of 0 given by ten deputies;the average of all scores is at 2.03. This therefore shows us that altogetherdiscrimination by federal organs on ethnic grounds is not stronglyfelt.Another question pertained to the assessment of quotas for ethnic minoritiesin the executive and legislative branches of the government. Eighteenout of thirty-one deputies felt that quotas should be preserved in order torepresent the autochthonous population. Some added that quotas would notexclude professionalism. Nine deputies explicitly spoke out against quotas,