Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

188 Rostislav Turovskiientrepreneurs, ‘Business Russia, ‘OPORa of Russia’ (an association ofsmall and medium enterprises), and a network of chambers of trade andcommerce. In practice, in such associations the political interests of businessare aggregated rather poorly. This can be partially explained by theindividualism and competitiveness of the business environment, whereactors pursue their personal gains. As most recent Russian experienceshows, the pressure from a stronger state has led not to consolidation ofbusiness, but to a search for individual expansion and survival strategieswhile maintaining political loyalty. Under Putin we have witnessed agrowing dependency of large business on the state. This stems from thecorrupt nature of big business, which often conducts illegal or semi-legalcommercial operations. We have also witnessed the government’s use ofthe power ministries and the judiciary for political purposes. As a result,the aggregation of political interests does not always take place within theframework of business associations, but rather is conducted through noninstitutionlizedforums based upon family and friendship ties, commoneconomic interests and joint projects. The following relations arecommon:• Lobbying business interests in bodies of authority. The sphere of governmentrelations is becoming increasingly popular in Russian companies,though one has to admit that there are few of them whose work in thisarea is very effective. Russian lobbyism is still at its early stages of developmentwhere it operates in corrupt forms. Its development (in any form)is conditioned by a number of factors, among which are the officials’competency and their understanding of business interests, as well as theiractual capabilities (which are often overestimated by business peoplebecause they have no clear understanding of decision-making mechanisms,scope of authority, budgetary limitations and conflicts within powerstructures). Another important factor is that bureaucrats’ own strategiesthat vary and are not always a priori obvious. They could have an interesteither in cooperation with business or in administrative control overbusiness, i.e. readiness to play the role of client of a business group, or adesire to become an influential patron. It is possible that some bureaucraticgroups may become amalgamated with certain business groups tothe detriment of others, or that they perform a careful balancing act andtry to maintain relations with several business groups.• Direct entry of representatives of business in power structures. This resultsfrom the weakness of business associations and the low effectiveness ofindirect lobbying. The most widespread form is entrepreneurs running forelected regional and municipal offices. This form is particularly convenientbecause the majority of the deputies in the regions work on apart-time basis, combining public service with their main occupation. Asregards full-time work in executive bodies of power, this would require acomplete transition from business to politics. This is one of the reasonswhy taking up a position in executive bodies is hardly a rational model of