Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

8 Vladimir Gel'manprevent unity of action by the Centre: its political course on this issue wentfrom reactive to proactive. Second, there was a shift in the balance of powerbetween the federal actors in the ideological coalitions concerned with localand regional policy. In the period 1991-8 it was the utilitarians who were thedriving force behind reforms in this field, establishing coalitions now withthe managerialists, now with the self-governmentalists and drawing otheractors to their cause. After August 1998 the utilitarians’ position came underpressure on account of the misfortunes of their economic policy. As a resultthe policy initiative passed to the managerialists, with the utilitarians nowplaying only a subordinate role. The self-governmentalists (whose influenceon policy decisions had been very limited) were also invited to enter the newcoalition, although their chances of influencing federal policy were slim.As a result, after 2000 the managerialists were able to pursue their interestsand ideology in the field of regional and local policy, drawing on thesupport of a wide range of federal elites, 30 and to launch a policy of recentralizationwithout serious opposition from other actors (in contrast to the1990s) – here the mass support enjoyed by the head of state was an importantfactor, and provided the window of opportunity that opened in 2000 fora radical shift towards recentralization. 31 The federal reform, announced byPutin in May 2000 was “doomed to succeed” insofar as it was (1) a keypoint in the manifesto of a strong and popular president; (2) supported by awide albeit fragile consensus between the federal elite and ordinary citizens;(3) aimed not only at raising the administrative potential of the Russian statebut at using this resource for carrying out the Centre’s policy. The consensusattained between federal-level elites allowed the Centre to speak with onevoice in its dealings with the regions and to formulate their shared interest ina policy of recentralization, brought about through maximizing federal controlover resources whilst minimizing federal responsibilities. The fact thatthe managerialists dominated the coalition around the ‘new centralism’meant that the reform was to bear their stamp, such that the new elites werein effect seeking, as Kathryn Stoner-Weiss put it, ‘a Soviet solution to post-Soviet problems’. 32The stance adopted by regional elites also went through some changes.Although in the 1990s the regions were in a negotiating relationship with thefederal centre, and could be seen to have a common interest in increasing thepowers and resources available to regions, rarely was there collaborationbetween elites of different regions in such negotiations. Each governor wasinterested in solving the problems of their particular region, whilst thereappeared to be no incentives for collective action to maximize regionalpower and resources. The asymmetry between regions limited the number ofthose leaders who were active in the process of regionalization and negotiationswith the centre: (1) republics (20 out of 88 subjects of the RussianFederation, excluding Chechnya), (2) donor regions (those that were netcontributors to the federal budget) – the number of these never exceeded 19,and only a few had the status of a republic. 33 However numerous the regions