Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

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The problem of effective representation 157The collapse of Russian communism brought about a certain vacuum ofpolitical values, ideas, aspirations, and under these conditions the actors’choice of political strategies was primarily dictated by rational and purposeorientatedmotivations. Therefore, I consider it appropriate to apply rationalchoice theory to explain the weakness of political parties on the regionallevel. Stemming from this, it can be hypothesized that a rational politician,who strives to become a regional parliament deputy, may choose between a‘party’ and ‘non-party’ strategy. Estimating the anticipated benefits and costs(losses) of each of these, rational actors will choose the most beneficialoption.The main advantage of the ‘party’ strategy is access to party resources –image-building, organizational (apparatus, activists), financial, information(party press), etc. A party, however, offers resources to a politician only inreturn for something, such as their membership and certain subsequentcommitments (financial support, obeying party discipline, supporting theparty’s political course, lobbying for certain decisions, etc.). All these are‘costs’ for a ‘rational’ politician. The ‘non-party’ strategy presupposes that apolitician has no access to party resources, but at the same time incurs noassociated costs. Hence, the rational choice of an actor depended on thecorrelation between (1) party and non-party resources; (2) resources andcosts.In the 1990s Russian political parties could not boast an abundance ofpolitical resources. Lack of funds, few activists and other weaknesses weretypical characteristics of regional party organizations. Neither did the partieshave any institutional election preferences. An overwhelming majority offederal subjects used a plural election formula and single-member constituencies.24 Starting from the works by Duverger, 25 it is widely believed thatsuch a system does not facilitate the development of political parties. 26 Thus,it is not surprising that most regional politicians favoured the ‘non-party’strategy. As a rule, they relied on the support of business groups or on personalresources. Theoretically, politicians could also utilize the resources ofcivic (non-for-profit) organizations, but the latter were just as weak as parties.Besides, there was one other political force in the regions that was capableof providing the necessary resources to politicians – the executiveauthority, the governors (usually free from party affiliation) who were veryinterested in the formation of an obedient regional legislature. Thus in realitya politician without one’s own resources had only two options: represent theinterests of either a business group or the governor. The parties, therefore,found themselves in a vicious circle: they had no resources because influentialactors were reluctant to join them, which came about in the first placebecause parties had no resources to attract such figures.In total, regional legislatures reflected the makeup of the respective regionalelites. This characteristic differed immensely from region to region.Aggregating a great deal of research on comparing regional politicalprocesses, 27 the following types of regional elites can be distinguished:
Table 7.1 The share of party deputies in ‘second cycle’ regional legislatures (in per centKemerovo Oblast 97.1Volgograd Oblast 87.5Krasnoyarsk Krai 83.3Krasnodar Krai 82.0Sverdlovsk Oblast 69.4Koryak AO 66.6Novosibirsk Oblast 55.1Bryansk Oblast 52.0St. Petersburg 52.0Adygeya 51.0Ryazan Oblast 50.0Kamchatka Oblast 48.7Kaluga Oblast 45.0Altai Krai 44.0Belgorod Oblast 40.0Stavropol Krai 40.0No. of regions 16Penza Oblast 37.8Smolensk Oblast 36.7Kaliningrad Oblast 34.4Omsk Oblast 33.0Khabarovsk Krai 32.0Kirov Oblast 31.5Rostov Oblast 31.1Altai 29.0Astrakhan Oblast 27.6Voronezh Oblast 26.7Ust 0 -Ordynskii Buryatskii AO 26.3Moscow 25.0Kareliya 24.6Orel Oblast 24.0Tula Oblast 22.9Mordoviya 22.7Irkutsk Oblast 22.0Tyva 21.9Orenburg Oblast 21.3Karachaevo-Cherkessiya 20.5Ivanovo Oblast 20.0Jewish AO 20.0Murmansk Oblast 20.0Tambov Oblast 20.0Ul 0 yanovsk Oblast 20.0No. of regions 25North Osetiya-Alaniya 18.7Chuvashiya 18.4Pskov Oblast 18.2Lipetsk Oblast 15.6Moscow Oblast 14.0
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9 Soviet Music and Societyunder Len
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40 Political and Social Thought inP
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First published 2009by Routledge2 P
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xContents8 The representation of bu
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List of contributorsMichael Burgess
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PrefaceThe chapters in this volume
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AcknowledgementsCameron Ross would
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2 Vladimir Gel'manconclusions on th
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4 Vladimir Gel'man• Recentralizat
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6 Vladimir Gel'manthat they themsel
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8 Vladimir Gel'manprevent unity of
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10 Vladimir Gel'manMeans and endsTh
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12 Vladimir Gel'manthe whole they s
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14 Vladimir Gel'manamendments, know
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16 Vladimir Gel'manfrom above; the
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18 Vladimir Gel'manfall in the aver
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20 Vladimir Gel'mancentralism’ co
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22 Vladimir Gel'man27 Douglass Nort
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24 Vladimir Gel'man78 Gel'man, Ryze
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26 Michael Burgesssuccessor, the Ru
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28 Michael Burgessthese remarks are
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30 Michael BurgessThe legacy of Sov
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32 Michael Burgessintensive constit
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34 Michael Burgess‘federalism’
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36 Michael Burgessriding postilion.
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38 Michael Burgesstradition that al
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40 Michael BurgessAustrian federati
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42 Michael Burgess3 Ethnic diversit
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44 Michael Burgesswhile the Walloon
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46 Michael Burgessmany constituent
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48 Michael Burgessthe special arran
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50 Michael Burgessmodified version
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52 Michael Burgess30 Riker, p. 39.
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3 Federal discourses, minority righ
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56 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderthe Yel
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58 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderPutin
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60 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderDuma La
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62 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderscatter
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64 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderThe sit
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66 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderis not
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68 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderMany re
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70 Andreas Heinemann-Grüder‘harm
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72 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderstating
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74 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderHahn’
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76 Andreas Heinemann-Grüdercounter
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78 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderreconfi
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80 Andreas Heinemann-Grüder30 Inte
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4 Unification as a political projec
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Table 4.2 Timetable of regional mer
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86 Oksana Orachevamaking more effec
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88 Oksana Orachevathrough a referen
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90 Oksana Orachevaargue that by the
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92 Oksana OrachevaThus, long before
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94 Oksana Orachevaand the Okrug. 39
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96 Oksana Orachevafor the merger, a
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98 Oksana Orachevamerger. As Yuri S
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100 Oksana Orachevaethnic identity
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102 Oksana Orachevaassemblies in th
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104 Oksana Oracheva28 Sergey Ilyin,
Page 123 and 124: 5 Putin and the election of regiona
Page 125 and 126: 108 Darrell SliderBashkortostan add
Page 127 and 128: 110 Darrell Slidergovernors were of
Page 129 and 130: 112 Darrell SliderPutin’s new pow
Page 131 and 132: 114 Darrell Sliderin turn takes ins
Page 133 and 134: 116 Darrell Sliderpolitical experie
Page 135 and 136: 118 Darrell Sliderappointed represe
Page 137 and 138: 6 Electoral reforms and democratiza
Page 139 and 140: 122 Aleksandr KynevThis phenomenon
Page 141 and 142: 124 Aleksandr Kynevvoluntarily), ni
Page 143 and 144: 126 Aleksandr Kyneveverywhere the p
Page 145 and 146: 128 Aleksandr Kynevregions where el
Page 147 and 148: 130 Aleksandr Kynevthe Federation h
Page 149 and 150: Table 6.3 Election to legislative a
Page 151 and 152: 134 Aleksandr Kynevgovernors came t
Page 153 and 154: 136 Aleksandr KynevLebedev), the Ru
Page 155 and 156: 138 Aleksandr Kynevof the total of
Page 157 and 158: 140 Aleksandr Kynevcases it was for
Page 159 and 160: 142 Aleksandr Kynevsubmitted, but n
Page 161 and 162: 144 Aleksandr KynevOn the other han
Page 163 and 164: 146 Aleksandr Kynevparliament in Ty
Page 165 and 166: 148 Aleksandr Kynevgovernors and re
Page 167 and 168: 7 Russian political parties and reg
Page 169 and 170: 152 Petr Panovmajoritarianism (‘t
Page 171 and 172: 154 Petr Panov(deputies) who are en
Page 173: 156 Petr Panovresult, the incentive
Page 177 and 178: Table 7.2The share of party deputie
Page 179 and 180: 162 Petr Panov1 ‘Autocracy’ (a
Page 181 and 182: 164 Petr Panovhalf the seats in the
Page 183 and 184: 166 Petr PanovTable 7.3Effective nu
Page 185 and 186: 168 Petr Panovactor. Therefore, the
Page 187 and 188: 170 Petr PanovThe years 2003-4 beca
Page 189 and 190: 172 Petr PanovVladimir Nelyubin, pu
Page 191 and 192: 174 Petr Panovby the previous ‘el
Page 193 and 194: 176 Petr PanovIn addition, the hete
Page 195 and 196: 178 Petr PanovFirst cycleelectionsS
Page 197 and 198: 180 Petr PanovFor Volgograd Oblast
Page 199 and 200: 182 Petr Panov37 M. Laakso and R. T
Page 201 and 202: 8 The representation of business el
Page 203 and 204: 186 Rostislav TurovskiiAt the same
Page 205 and 206: 188 Rostislav Turovskiientrepreneur
Page 207 and 208: 190 Rostislav Turovskiibusiness in
Page 209 and 210: 192 Rostislav Turovskiirepresentati
Page 211 and 212: 194 Rostislav Turovskiiand was sent
Page 213 and 214: 196 Rostislav Turovskiiper cent of
Page 215 and 216: 198 Rostislav Turovskiiof sociologi
Page 217 and 218: 200 Rostislav TurovskiiAs governors
Page 219 and 220: 202 Rostislav Turovskiicompany. Thi
Page 221 and 222: 204 Rostislav TurovskiiNominating f
Page 223 and 224: 206 Rostislav Turovskii14 Budargin
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208 Elena Denezhkina and Adrian Cam
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228 Hellmut Wollmann and Elena Grit
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11 Russia’s elusive pursuit of ba
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250 John F. Youngcentre. This is on
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252 John F. Youngcommonly, however,
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254 John F. Youngcounter-reform. Th
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256 John F. Younglegislative acts o
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258 John F. Youngplay behind these
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260 John F. Youngbeen weakened in i
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262 John F. Young24 Vladimir Gel'ma
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264 Vertical or triangle?alleged mi
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266 Vertical or triangle?The Kozak
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268 Vertical or triangle?critics of
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270 Vertical or triangle?would be n
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272 Vertical or triangle?law-based
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274 Vertical or triangle?difficult
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276 Vertical or triangle?and the go
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278 Vertical or triangle?Given that
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280 Vertical or triangle?In conclus
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282 Vertical or triangle?szelenyi60
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13 Municipal elections and electora
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286 Cameron RossPutin the new PR sy
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288 Cameron RossElections of chairs
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290 Cameron Rosshaving to submit a
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292 Cameron RossMunicipal Raion in
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294 Cameron Ross80 per cent of the
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296 Cameron RossParty competition w
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298 Cameron RossDonskoi has stated
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300 Cameron Rossdominated by member
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302 Cameron Ross10 Vladimr Putin,
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304 Cameron Ross67 Laura Belin, ‘
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306 IndexLankina, Tomila 289Law on
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