Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

Federal discourses, minority rights, and conflict transformation 75Putin’s policy does not just curb the authoritarian policy styles of governorsor republican presidents, it undermines the prerequisites for democratization.With the abolition of the federal power division, Putin underminesdemocratic institutions. De-federalization and de-democratization aremutually conducive. The equalization disempowers regional politics, reducesthe division of powers, minimizes the representation and access channels of theregions in the federal system, increases executive accountability at the expenseof democratic accountability, and identifies the ‘centre’ with the federation.The president nominates chief executives of the regions, the regional Dumawill rubber-stamp the nominee, and if not, the president may install an‘acting governor’ and threaten to dissolve the regional Duma. The presidentwill have the right to fire a governor, but the regional Duma will not. Criticshave pointed out that this practice violates articles 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 32, 71, 72,and 73 of the Constitution, as well as several Constitutional Court rulings inwhich the court held that only the direct election of regional leaders can beconsidered to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. However, theConstitutional Court, contrary to the opinion of leading Russian specialistson constitutional law, approved the presidential nomination procedure forgovernors. The chief executives in Chechnya and Ingushetiya have alreadygiven a preview of presidential appointees lacking legitimacy in the regions;one could even go as far as to say that Putin’s reforms follow a model ofChechenization of federal–regional relations: additional control layers andbuffer zones, and rule on the ground by proxy.The past mix of confrontation and cooperation has changed due to theimpact of Putin’s re-centralization. The republics are more adaptive andcooperative, and less confrontational. However, Putin’s policy not only consistsof intimidation and confrontation; he has offered informal deals such asallowing the incumbent president to stay in power for a third term. In practice,Putin’s ‘dictatorship of the law’ follows double standards. A law onregional bodies of government, adopted in October 1999, allows governorsto run for a third and even fourth term – de facto in return for notobstructing the implementation of Putin’s policies. The legal two-term limitonly begins with the adoption of the law in 1999. The repenting presidents ofTatarstan (Shaimiev), Bashkortostan (Rakhimov), Kabardino-Balkariya(Kokov), Kalmykiya (Ilyumzhinov) and Dagestan (Magomedov) wereallowed to run for a third term because they promised loyalty and offeredfavourable electoral outcomes for United Russia or Putin’s second term aspresident. In these cases Putin preferred leadership continuity and loyalty tothe ‘rule of law’. Less submissive or subservient republican presidents – suchas Nikolaev in Sakha and Spiridonov in Komi – were forced to leave officeor were not allowed to run for a third term. In some of the Muslim republicsof the North Caucasus, the federal government, on the grounds of counteringfundamentalism or preventing Islamist counter-reactions, tolerated legislationcontradicting federal laws or the Constitution. In Karachaevo-Cherkessiya,for example, a law was accepted on the grounds that it was supposed to