Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Table 7.2 (continued)Kemerovo Oblast 100.0Ivanovo Oblast 11.4Sakhalin Oblast 11.0Marii El 10.4Astrakhan Oblast 10.3Chuvashiya 9.6Orel Oblast 8.0Stavropol Krai 8.0Novgorod Oblast 7.7Perm Oblast 7.5Kabardino-Balkariya 6.9Aginsk Buryat AO 6.7Khakasiya 6.7Komi-Permyak AO 6.7Nizhni Novgorod Oblast 6.7Ust-Ordynskii Buryatskii AO 6.7Orenburg Oblast 6.4No. of regions 37Tomsk Oblast 4.8Yamalo-Nenets AO 4.8Kursk Oblast 4.4Yaroslavl 0 Murmansk Oblast 4.0Vologda Oblast 3.3Buryatiya 3.1Belgorod Oblast 2.9Lipetsk Oblast 2.7Dagestan 2.5Kareliya 2.5Chelyabinsk Oblast 2.2Tatarstan 1.5Chukotka AO .0Yevenk AO .0Ingushetiya .0Irkutsk Oblast .0Jewish AO .0Kalmykiya .0Khanty-Mansiisk AO .0Kostroma Oblast .0Kurgan Oblast .0Magadan Oblast .0Nenets AO .0Taimyr AO .0No. of regions 25Source: Compiled by the author.
162 Petr Panov1 ‘Autocracy’ (a virtually homogeneous elite, the dominant actor is thegovernor or a business group exercising full control over regional politics);2 ‘Soft autocracy’ (there is a weak opposition group or groups);3 ‘Elites settlement’ (the regional elite is heterogeneous, but the leader,governor, is powerful enough to reconcile conflicts and secure consolidationof elite groups);4 ‘Fragmented elite’ (the regional elite is split, hence political instability andacute struggle between elite groups);5 ‘Polarized elite’ (elite groups are integrated into two opposing camps).Consequently, the regional legislatures were not amorphous packs of ‘independent’deputies. On the contrary, they were structured into informalgroups 28 reflecting the makeup of regional elites, which provided the deputieswith a means of coordination. Formally ‘independent’ deputies wouldrepresent the interests of one or another elite group. On occasion the governoror some influential clique would publicly declare an informal ‘list ofcandidates’ they supported at regional legislature elections. Therefore, theprocess of institutionalization of the political structure in most regionalassemblies was largely precipitated by financial and economic interests ratherthan by political or ideological orientation. In ‘autocratic assemblies’, forexample, deputies’ ‘independence’ made no difference, as almost all of themwere in fact members of informal groups – clienteles of the dominant regionalactor. In regions with a ‘fragmented elite’ there were several such clienteles. 29The picture painted above was typical of the Russian regional politics inthe 1990s. At the same time, there were a few deviant cases when politicalparties did play a significant role. It should be pointed out that in itself adeputy’s membership in a party was not equivalent to the party mechanismof representation. In the majority of cases party deputies secured electionvictories without much recourse to party resources, so they were not burdenedby any obligations. 30 Therefore, speaking about deviant cases I do notrefer to the membership of deputies in parties but rather to the small numberof regions where political parties were actually structuring the composition andactivity of regional parliaments. There were several reasons for the formation ofthese deviant cases: 31First, the Communist Party, re-established in 1993, was rather strong insome regions (the so-called ‘Red Belt’). For instance, Volgograd, Bryansk,Kamchatka oblasts and the Koryak Autonomous Okrug can be regarded asregions where Communist Party representation was fairly active, as theregional Communist Party branches steered the political process and controlledtheir own deputies. In these regions a significant percentage of theelectorate were more interested in the party affiliation of a candidate than inthe candidate’s personal qualities.A second factor is related to the peculiarities of the regional electoralsystems. Prior to 2003 subjects of the Federation had a right to set up theirown electoral institutions, and some of them adopted a proportional
Page 4 and 5:
9 Soviet Music and Societyunder Len
Page 6:
40 Political and Social Thought inP
Page 9 and 10:
First published 2009by Routledge2 P
Page 11 and 12:
xContents8 The representation of bu
Page 13 and 14:
List of contributorsMichael Burgess
Page 15 and 16:
PrefaceThe chapters in this volume
Page 17 and 18:
AcknowledgementsCameron Ross would
Page 19 and 20:
2 Vladimir Gel'manconclusions on th
Page 21 and 22:
4 Vladimir Gel'man• Recentralizat
Page 23 and 24:
6 Vladimir Gel'manthat they themsel
Page 25 and 26:
8 Vladimir Gel'manprevent unity of
Page 27 and 28:
10 Vladimir Gel'manMeans and endsTh
Page 29 and 30:
12 Vladimir Gel'manthe whole they s
Page 31 and 32:
14 Vladimir Gel'manamendments, know
Page 33 and 34:
16 Vladimir Gel'manfrom above; the
Page 35 and 36:
18 Vladimir Gel'manfall in the aver
Page 37 and 38:
20 Vladimir Gel'mancentralism’ co
Page 39 and 40:
22 Vladimir Gel'man27 Douglass Nort
Page 41 and 42:
24 Vladimir Gel'man78 Gel'man, Ryze
Page 43 and 44:
26 Michael Burgesssuccessor, the Ru
Page 45 and 46:
28 Michael Burgessthese remarks are
Page 47 and 48:
30 Michael BurgessThe legacy of Sov
Page 49 and 50:
32 Michael Burgessintensive constit
Page 51 and 52:
34 Michael Burgess‘federalism’
Page 53 and 54:
36 Michael Burgessriding postilion.
Page 55 and 56:
38 Michael Burgesstradition that al
Page 57 and 58:
40 Michael BurgessAustrian federati
Page 59 and 60:
42 Michael Burgess3 Ethnic diversit
Page 61 and 62:
44 Michael Burgesswhile the Walloon
Page 63 and 64:
46 Michael Burgessmany constituent
Page 65 and 66:
48 Michael Burgessthe special arran
Page 67 and 68:
50 Michael Burgessmodified version
Page 69 and 70:
52 Michael Burgess30 Riker, p. 39.
Page 71 and 72:
3 Federal discourses, minority righ
Page 73 and 74:
56 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderthe Yel
Page 75 and 76:
58 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderPutin
Page 77 and 78:
60 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderDuma La
Page 79 and 80:
62 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderscatter
Page 81 and 82:
64 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderThe sit
Page 83 and 84:
66 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderis not
Page 85 and 86:
68 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderMany re
Page 87 and 88:
70 Andreas Heinemann-Grüder‘harm
Page 89 and 90:
72 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderstating
Page 91 and 92:
74 Andreas Heinemann-GrüderHahn’
Page 93 and 94:
76 Andreas Heinemann-Grüdercounter
Page 95 and 96:
78 Andreas Heinemann-Grüderreconfi
Page 97 and 98:
80 Andreas Heinemann-Grüder30 Inte
Page 99 and 100:
4 Unification as a political projec
Page 101 and 102:
Table 4.2 Timetable of regional mer
Page 103 and 104:
86 Oksana Orachevamaking more effec
Page 105 and 106:
88 Oksana Orachevathrough a referen
Page 107 and 108:
90 Oksana Orachevaargue that by the
Page 109 and 110:
92 Oksana OrachevaThus, long before
Page 111 and 112:
94 Oksana Orachevaand the Okrug. 39
Page 113 and 114:
96 Oksana Orachevafor the merger, a
Page 115 and 116:
98 Oksana Orachevamerger. As Yuri S
Page 117 and 118:
100 Oksana Orachevaethnic identity
Page 119 and 120:
102 Oksana Orachevaassemblies in th
Page 121 and 122:
104 Oksana Oracheva28 Sergey Ilyin,
Page 123 and 124:
5 Putin and the election of regiona
Page 125 and 126:
108 Darrell SliderBashkortostan add
Page 127 and 128: 110 Darrell Slidergovernors were of
Page 129 and 130: 112 Darrell SliderPutin’s new pow
Page 131 and 132: 114 Darrell Sliderin turn takes ins
Page 133 and 134: 116 Darrell Sliderpolitical experie
Page 135 and 136: 118 Darrell Sliderappointed represe
Page 137 and 138: 6 Electoral reforms and democratiza
Page 139 and 140: 122 Aleksandr KynevThis phenomenon
Page 141 and 142: 124 Aleksandr Kynevvoluntarily), ni
Page 143 and 144: 126 Aleksandr Kyneveverywhere the p
Page 145 and 146: 128 Aleksandr Kynevregions where el
Page 147 and 148: 130 Aleksandr Kynevthe Federation h
Page 149 and 150: Table 6.3 Election to legislative a
Page 151 and 152: 134 Aleksandr Kynevgovernors came t
Page 153 and 154: 136 Aleksandr KynevLebedev), the Ru
Page 155 and 156: 138 Aleksandr Kynevof the total of
Page 157 and 158: 140 Aleksandr Kynevcases it was for
Page 159 and 160: 142 Aleksandr Kynevsubmitted, but n
Page 161 and 162: 144 Aleksandr KynevOn the other han
Page 163 and 164: 146 Aleksandr Kynevparliament in Ty
Page 165 and 166: 148 Aleksandr Kynevgovernors and re
Page 167 and 168: 7 Russian political parties and reg
Page 169 and 170: 152 Petr Panovmajoritarianism (‘t
Page 171 and 172: 154 Petr Panov(deputies) who are en
Page 173 and 174: 156 Petr Panovresult, the incentive
Page 175 and 176: Table 7.1 The share of party deputi
Page 177: Table 7.2The share of party deputie
Page 181 and 182: 164 Petr Panovhalf the seats in the
Page 183 and 184: 166 Petr PanovTable 7.3Effective nu
Page 185 and 186: 168 Petr Panovactor. Therefore, the
Page 187 and 188: 170 Petr PanovThe years 2003-4 beca
Page 189 and 190: 172 Petr PanovVladimir Nelyubin, pu
Page 191 and 192: 174 Petr Panovby the previous ‘el
Page 193 and 194: 176 Petr PanovIn addition, the hete
Page 195 and 196: 178 Petr PanovFirst cycleelectionsS
Page 197 and 198: 180 Petr PanovFor Volgograd Oblast
Page 199 and 200: 182 Petr Panov37 M. Laakso and R. T
Page 201 and 202: 8 The representation of business el
Page 203 and 204: 186 Rostislav TurovskiiAt the same
Page 205 and 206: 188 Rostislav Turovskiientrepreneur
Page 207 and 208: 190 Rostislav Turovskiibusiness in
Page 209 and 210: 192 Rostislav Turovskiirepresentati
Page 211 and 212: 194 Rostislav Turovskiiand was sent
Page 213 and 214: 196 Rostislav Turovskiiper cent of
Page 215 and 216: 198 Rostislav Turovskiiof sociologi
Page 217 and 218: 200 Rostislav TurovskiiAs governors
Page 219 and 220: 202 Rostislav Turovskiicompany. Thi
Page 221 and 222: 204 Rostislav TurovskiiNominating f
Page 223 and 224: 206 Rostislav Turovskii14 Budargin
Page 225 and 226: 208 Elena Denezhkina and Adrian Cam
Page 227 and 228: 210 Elena Denezhkina and Adrian Cam
Page 229 and 230:
212 Elena Denezhkina and Adrian Cam
Page 231 and 232:
Page 233 and 234:
Page 235 and 236:
Page 237 and 238:
Page 239 and 240:
Page 241 and 242:
Page 243 and 244:
Page 245 and 246:
228 Hellmut Wollmann and Elena Grit
Page 247 and 248:
Page 249 and 250:
Page 251 and 252:
Page 253 and 254:
Page 255 and 256:
Page 257 and 258:
Page 259 and 260:
Page 261 and 262:
Page 263 and 264:
Page 265 and 266:
11 Russia’s elusive pursuit of ba
Page 267 and 268:
250 John F. Youngcentre. This is on
Page 269 and 270:
252 John F. Youngcommonly, however,
Page 271 and 272:
254 John F. Youngcounter-reform. Th
Page 273 and 274:
256 John F. Younglegislative acts o
Page 275 and 276:
258 John F. Youngplay behind these
Page 277 and 278:
260 John F. Youngbeen weakened in i
Page 279 and 280:
262 John F. Young24 Vladimir Gel'ma
Page 281 and 282:
264 Vertical or triangle?alleged mi
Page 283 and 284:
266 Vertical or triangle?The Kozak
Page 285 and 286:
268 Vertical or triangle?critics of
Page 287 and 288:
270 Vertical or triangle?would be n
Page 289 and 290:
272 Vertical or triangle?law-based
Page 291 and 292:
274 Vertical or triangle?difficult
Page 293 and 294:
276 Vertical or triangle?and the go
Page 295 and 296:
278 Vertical or triangle?Given that
Page 297 and 298:
280 Vertical or triangle?In conclus
Page 299 and 300:
282 Vertical or triangle?szelenyi60
Page 301 and 302:
13 Municipal elections and electora
Page 303 and 304:
286 Cameron RossPutin the new PR sy
Page 305 and 306:
288 Cameron RossElections of chairs
Page 307 and 308:
290 Cameron Rosshaving to submit a
Page 309 and 310:
292 Cameron RossMunicipal Raion in
Page 311 and 312:
294 Cameron Ross80 per cent of the
Page 313 and 314:
296 Cameron RossParty competition w
Page 315 and 316:
298 Cameron RossDonskoi has stated
Page 317 and 318:
300 Cameron Rossdominated by member
Page 319 and 320:
302 Cameron Ross10 Vladimr Putin,
Page 321 and 322:
304 Cameron Ross67 Laura Belin, ‘
Page 323:
306 IndexLankina, Tomila 289Law on
show all

Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?