Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

38 Michael Burgesstradition that all political authority and all lines of political communicationmust emanate from the centre – cannot be easily circumvented. The incorporationof federal principles and procedures in the Constitution of theRussian Federation cannot automatically erase centuries of centralist habitsand practices. The relationships between the state, government, the economyand civil society are in constant flux but they still draw heavily upon thetraditions of the past.Nothing better expresses this hallmark of the Russian Federation than theinstitutional design of the state, a federation in which there is a ‘uniquecoexistence of super-presidentialism and federal power-sharing’. 40 The concentrationof executive power in the institution of the presidency thatremains a symbol of Yeltsin’s personal triumph over the parliamentary forcesin the state is also an enduring historical legacy of the centralization ofpower in the hands of successive tsars and a long line of General Secretariesof the CPSU. In this light, President Putin is firmly cast in a dominant leadershiprole that stretches back to Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Stalin, Lenin,Nicholas II and Alexander I. These centralist presidential features includerule by decree, veto powers over the legislature, control over regionaladministrations, emergency powers and more recently a regression back tothe appointment of governors. As Heinemann-Grüder has put it, presidentialfederalism is a governmental system that entailsConflict between centralism and regionalism as a systemic feature. …The greatest danger for Russian federalism thus seems to flow from apresidentialism that attempts to be strong in implementation of legislationand executive power, but that cannot keep its promise, that is, aformal presidentialism without any corresponding power of redistributionand implementation. 41In this light the recent decision to extend central control over Russia’s eightynineregions by terminating the direct elections of governors in favour ofpresidential nominees who must be approved by elected regional parliamentswas indicative of the current determination to tighten the political grip ofexecutive-presidential authority on the federal state.Turning to look at comparisons, it must be recognized that all federationsare constantly subject to the simultaneous push and pull of centralist anddecentralist pressures and tensions. This is the very stuff of federalism andfederation. It is also important to note that constitutional autonomy is moreimportant than any particular division of powers and competences betweenthe federal government and the governments of the constituent units. It isperfectly possible therefore to have federations that are either highly centralizedor highly decentralized. Federations that share strong centralistcharacteristics with the Russian federal model are not hard to find. India,Malaysia and Nigeria each display a variety of strong centralist features andit is also worth underlining the contemporary unitary trends and