Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

252 John F. Youngcommonly, however, electoral turnout for local elections in the RussianFederation averaged about one-third of registered voters, with higher turnoutsreaching 70 per cent and low turnouts falling below 20 per cent. 15Second, despite any measure of political independence for local governmentsfostered by law, there was an acute lack of local capacity to delivermuch-needed services. 16 Efforts to strengthen the financial base of localgovernments through legislation, such as the tax code of 1991, or the budgetlaws of 1993 and 1997, failed to compensate for the realities of economicdecline and inflation or the use of intergovernmental transfers as unduepolitical leverage. Additionally, the privatization of enterprises and diminishedindustrial output meant that many services previously provided byemployers were cancelled or transferred to local governments, placinggreater stress on local budgets. By one estimate, local governments experienceda 65 per cent increase in the demand for the provision of social servicessuch as day cares and health clinics, and a tenfold increase for theprovision of municipal housing. 17 As a result, local financial resources werewoefully insufficient to provide such services as health care, public education,social benefits, and public housing. One mayor described the situation: ‘It isno secret that budgets are the most difficult sphere in the relations betweenthe regions of the Federation and organs of local self-government. Yes, wehave a municipal budget. It is a strange thing. We have numbers, and wehave accountability. But as for money, we have none.’ 18 While local governmentswere charged with the delivery of services, the financing, standards,and objectives of such policies were determined by federal ministries andregional administrations. In this regard, local governments were agents ofhigher-level administrations, a role that was in direct conflict with their legalstatus as organs of self-government. Such mismatched revenues and responsibilitiesare not uncommon in the practice of multi-level governance. 19 InRussia, however, no level of government had the resources to pay for thepromised public services. Dmitrii Kozak pointed out in 2003 that the estimatedcost of fulfilling the social obligations of the state were more thantwice the total state budget. 20Third, the implementation of federal laws was a mess at the local level.This was not merely a consequence of insufficient financial resources, butalso a reflection of parochialism and insufficiently qualified personnel. Thelatter characteristic followed from high turnover rates, lack of training, andsusceptibility to corruption. Stalin once infamously remarked that ‘cadresdecide everything’, and local governments were not only conceptually andfinancially adrift from regional and state administrations but also constrainedby the limited abilities of their own personnel. Discussing localefforts to register and supervise religious associations in accordance withFederal law, for example, Nina Volodina has highlighted the ways in whichfederal agencies and ministries relied on local governments to performfunctions outside local purview. Seemingly innocuous measures, such asproperty use, construction permits, and registration of religious