Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

8 The representation of business elites inregional politicsÉtatism, elitism, and clientelismRostislav TurovskiiBusiness and politics are closely connected. Many members of the businesselite are members of influential interest groups. In democratic polyarchies,western students of political science have noted the disproportionate influenceof large economic corporations in the political process. 1 The role of economiccorporations with their resources and political interests is one of thereasons for a deformation of polyarchies, in which the dispersion of power isfar from even.Russia is clearly not a western-type polyarchy. The concentration of powerin the hands of certain influence groups is much higher than in the West, andpolitically active business structures usually compete with high-ranking stateofficials for influence or enter into clientelistic relations with them. TheRussian situation should be analysed from the standpoint of elitism, ratherthan competitive polyarchy because of this massive concentration of powerin the hands of power and business elites. Members of these economic andpolitical elites are closely intertwined and at the same time split into rivallinggroups.Unequal access to power has been characteristic of Russia at every stageof its history. The post-Soviet period is no exception, epitomized as it is by asharp increase in socio-economic inequalities and new and deeper forms ofsocial inequality brought about in the transition from communism to capitalism.When public interest in politics is low, personal involvement is insignificant andparty politics and interest group activity is badly organized, politics becomes aplayground for small groups well endowed with financial resources and roots inthe business environment, or those enjoying patrimonial–clientelistic relationswith the business environment.The universal rationality model, or ‘rational choice theory’, seems to bethe most obvious analytic paradigm to employ when studying the politicalactivity of business structures and individual entrepreneurs. This stems fromanother principle widely regarded as self-evident, namely that an entrepreneuris by definition a rational actor in the economic realm and that suchrational behaviour will be transferred to the political realm. In our case gainmeans not only a growth of political influence, but also an expansion of thefirms of those entrepreneurs who engage in politics. The political market, as