Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

182 Petr Panov37 M. Laakso and R. Taagepera, ‘Effective number of parties: a measure withapplication to West Europe’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1979.38 While calculating the ENP index I did not take into account non-party deputiesbecause their number had drastically diminished and did not distort the overallpicture.39 Regretfully, excluding opponents from the ballot under the pretext that they violatedelectoral legislation is common practice in Russian regions.40 This section is mostly based on the empirical data gathered in participant observationsand expert reports.41 One of the main reasons for this was the fact that the interests of the most influentialgroups did not directly overlap. Each of them were in control of their ownsphere.42 In actual fact, these rules were applied in 2006 to the Perm Krai Legislatureelections, not the oblast legislature elections, as in 2005 Perm Oblast and Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug were merged to form a new subject of theFederation – Perm Krai.43 In Perm Oblast United Russia won 30.72 per cent of the ballot, which was comparablewith the votes cast for Unity and OVR together in 1999 (19.82 per centand 10.03 per cent respectively).44 In addition, because of the ongoing merger he could not become a fully-fledgedGovernor for legal reasons, having to make do with the status of ‘acting’Governor for eighteen months. It was only once all the legalities regarding theformation of a new federal subject, Perm Krai, had been completed in December2005, that full gubernatorial powers were bestowed upon him (according to the newlaws, he was nominated by President Putin for the position of governor to thelegislatures of Perm oblast and Komi-Permyak autonomous okrug and hereceived endorsement by both assemblies).45 A lack of coordination between the central leadership and regional branches ofUnited Russia has often been observed. For example, an acute collision of interestscame about in the elections for the Belgorod Regional Assembly in 2005. Theregional branch of United Russia actively campaigned against candidates unofficiallysupported by the mayor of Moscow, Yury Luzhkov, who is one of the mostinfluential leaders of United Russia. The conflict had been fuelled by overlappingfinancial and economic interests.46 ‘Permskim edinorossam ne chvataet mesta v predviybornych spiskach?’, NoviyKompan' on Website, http://www.nk.perm.ru/news.php?news_id = 5236, accessed17 August 2006.47 It is worth noting that in an overwhelming majority of the winning single-memberconstituencies United Russia candidates had no serious rivals. In some cases itwas explained by the great private resources of the candidates. In other casespolitical bargaining and pressure cleared the constituencies of opponents.48 Respectively 11.08 per cent and 14.75 per cent in 1995; 14.15 per cent and 7.51per cent in 1999; 7.62 per cent and 12.91 per cent in 2003.49 Plotnikov was accused of ‘bribing’ voters, which had allegedly taken place in theform of promises of improving the welfare of pensioners. Other candidates havealso resorted to the same false promises in their election campaigns.50 The conflict between these three parties in the process of unification has takenplace in many regions. Some parties’ branches do not like to be seen as one of the‘party of power’ as is the case with ‘A Just Russia’ (the St Petersburg branch ofRodina joined the Patriots of Russia instead of a Just Russia). Others on thecontrary do not like to be the second ‘party of power’ (the Tatarstan branch ofthe Russian Pensioners’ Party cooperated with United Russia instead of a A JustRussia).