Federalism and Local Politics in Russia

Leviathan’s return 15the national policy also ceased to be a priority for the managerialists whowere becoming more interested in preserving the status quo than introducingfurther reforms. Paradoxically, therefore, it was the early success of therecentralization campaign that hindered its further advance.Against this background, the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections,although decided in the autumn of 2004 as a response to a very specific setof circumstances, was nonetheless a logical culmination of the policy ofrecentralization. Although, from the point of view of effective administration,it arguably added little that was new, its political consequences werequite predictable. First of all, the Centre minimized political uncertainty inthe regions, which would otherwise have arisen from unpredictable results ofcompetitive elections. In addition the increase in the political weight of theregional legislatures, which accompanied the weakening of the now appointedregional heads, served to strengthen the position of ‘United Russia’ (itwas no accident that in the autumn of 2005 there was a decision to give thepower of proposing candidates for the post of regional head to whicheverpolitical party had won a majority in the elections to the regional legislature).However, on a personal level little really changed in Centre–regionalrelations: in most regions the existing regional heads were reappointed. As ofOctober 2006, previous incumbents had been appointed in thirty-four out offorty-nine oblasts, 64 although several were subsequently dismissed. In additionall the existing heads of republics were appointed to their posts. Newleaders were only appointed in cases where the Centre had personal reservationsabout individual personalities (Ivanovo Oblast, Altai Republic) orwhere there was a serious conflict within the regional elite (Saratov andNizhegorodskaya Oblasts) (see Chapter 5).Appointment of a regional head ‘from outside’ (i.e. from outside theregion) has been untypical, and has only occurred in a small number of cases(Ivanovo, Nizhegorodskaya, Kaliningrad Oblasts). This reflects not only alack of suitable candidates at the Centre for regional posts, but also theCentre’s tendency towards risk aversion, and a desire to maintain the statusquo in Centre–regional relations, whilst holding the appointed regionalheads responsible for the situation in the regions entrusted to them.By the beginning of 2006 the policy of recentralization in Russia had beentaken to its logical conclusion. If we leave to one side the unresolved problemsfacing federal policy in the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus 65then it is possible to consider the vast majority of regions as fully subordinateto the Centre, politically, economically and administratively. What,then, does this ‘new centralism’ mean for Russian politics?‘New centralism’: costs and benefitsAt first sight the policy of recentralization may be seen to have resulted inthe re-establishment of the managerialists’ dream of the ‘good’ Soviet Union.Regional and local autonomy has been replaced by a system of controls