The Quest for Relevant Air Power

French Air Force │ 93
allowed France a certain degree of freedom of manoeuvre between
the two superpowers, and the new security challenges meant that
France had to embark upon a path of rapprochement towards its
NATO partners.
Reasons for rapprochement were manifold. A crucial one was
France’s active involvement in UN operations. While France’s rank
and status were secured by an independent nuclear force during the
Cold War era, this formula was only partially valid in the post–Cold
War era. Particularly in the early 1990s, France sought to secure its
international status and permanent seat in the UN Security Council
through a decisive role and enhanced visibility in peace support operations.
As the conduct of these operations was largely shaped by
NATO councils and committees, participation in the decisionmaking
process was considered necessary. 65
Only by embedding its actions into a multilateral framework was
France able to defend its interests and to influence international
affairs. In the first half of the 1990s, France undertook a whole
series of initiatives within the WEU, EU, or NATO aimed at establishing
an autonomous European defence and security architecture.
66 For instance, the setting up of a Franco-German army corps
in 1992, later to become known as Eurocorps, was conceived to be
the nucleus of a European army. 67 In short, Europe had become
France’s new frontier, and French officials perceived it as their
sphere of influence. Particularly through the construction of a
common European defence, French status would be fostered. 68
However, not being able to prise its European partners away from
the comfort of an American commitment to European security,
France had to attain reform from within NATO to foster a more
autonomous European defence. 69
Already in 1994, the Defence White Book conveyed a certain
shift in French paradigms. On the one hand, it argued that NATO
must become an arena where the European security and defence
identity could establish itself and that the adaptation of NATO to
the new strategic conditions must be resolutely pursued. On the
other, the White Book clearly restated the particular French status
within NATO. It argued that the principles laid down in 1966, including
non-participation in NATO’s integrated military structure,
would continue to guide French relations with the organisation. 70