The Quest for Relevant Air Power

ROYAL NETHERLANDS Air Force │ 231
ing to the 1:2:1 formula, allocating half of the budget to the Army
and approximately a quarter each to the other services. 43
According to the broad approach to air power which this book
takes, the air power assets of the Navy and Army have to be included
as well. In the 1990s, the Army operated between 60 and 95
Gepard self-propelled, radar guided anti-aircraft guns, between 60
and 131 towed anti-aircraft guns, and approximately 300 Stinger
man-portable air defence systems. Furthermore, the Navy operated
22 Lynx helicopters and 13 P-3C Orion anti-submarine warfare
aircraft. 44 While the P-3Cs were sold to Germany and Portugal,
the 21 remaining Lynx airframes, including four kept in
non-flyable condition, were brought under the auspices of the
Command of the Air Forces in 2008. 45 In addition to these aircraft,
the Navy operated between 10 and 14 frigates, all equipped
with air defence systems. 46 If these systems are included, air power
expenditure is greater than the funding of the single services
might suggest. However, it is still considerably lower as a proportion
than that of the United States. This state of affairs prompted
an RNLAF lieutenant colonel to maintain, “I see no recognition of
the fact that . . . air power is at the core, at the heart of the European
military capability gap.” 47
Despite the relatively low budget, the RNLAF became from the
early 1990s up to 2002 the weapon of choice in operations at the
upper end of the spectrum of military force. According to a Dutch
commentator, the RNLAF gained quite a reputation among politicians
in the wake of the air operations over the Balkans. Contrary
to the Army’s troublesome experience in Bosnia, Dutch air power
was perceived to add to the Netherlands’ prestige abroad. As a
result, from 1999 to 2002, the RNLAF was indeed the preferred
instrument—at least in the eyes of major factions in The Hague
and in the media. An example is the Parliament’s insistence that
the Dutch land contribution to the operation United Nations Mission
in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2000–2001 was to be
accompanied by Apache combat helicopters. Yet, according to an
interviewee, the Dutch perspective on air power has become less
enthusiastic. 48 This might be because stabilisation operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan have required relatively large ground force
contingents. Against this backdrop, the Royal Netherlands Army
has also gained respect for its international commitments. During