The Quest for Relevant Air Power

354 │ CONCLUSION
study course comparable to that of SAASS in the United States.
While ventures such as the EAG or NATO’s JAPCC are commendable
and help European air forces to become more interoperable,
they do not really address challenges on an intellectual level.
Genuine European air power also requires a conceptual grasp
of air power theory and history. No European air power school of
thought has yet emerged and encapsulated modern Europe’s gradualist
approach to air war. This mindset is a result of Europe’s
rather tenuous political environment and preference for integrated
and stabilisation operations. If European air forces intend
to go beyond mere pooling of forces and to be an effective tool for
common military and foreign political goals, a conceptual grasp
of air power is essential.
Procurement
Continental European states generally have pursued three
approaches to procurement—national programmes, cooperative
programmes, and buying off the shelf. The low impact of politicoindustrial
concerns in the Netherlands has facilitated its ability to
buy off the shelf, allowing the procurement of advanced American
aircraft at relatively low unit costs. As a result, the RNLAF has
been able to concentrate almost exclusively upon operational requirements
and thereby to generate—in the short term at least—
relevant air power. Buying off the shelf freed resources which
could be invested in swing-role training.
In contrast, the path of strategic independence, as pursued by
France, has its price in terms of operational effectiveness. Ambitious
national development programmes in times of constrained
defence budgets have led to significant delays in acquiring new
capabilities. Particularly, the French air transport fleet has been
suffering from chronic shortcomings and overstretch. This leads
to a further conclusion which has affected all of the four air forces
to a larger or lesser degree. Essentially, they ignored the impact of
cost escalation on procurement and adopted overambitious plans.
Plans had to be subsequently cancelled, as was, for instance, the
case with a planned Franco-German SEAD missile
Despite the consequent loss of capabilities, such as dedicated
SEAD, the FAF has been able to retain a balanced force structure,