The Quest for Relevant Air Power

CONCLUSION │ 349
of these ventures, major European air forces, such as the RAF or
the FAF, have gained leadership experience by taking on responsibility
for combined air component commands. Yet, despite the
adoption of a common operational doctrine, certain distinct features
have been retained by the air forces examined. The RNLAF
has employed its swing-role concept to great effect, and the FAF
has excelled in deploying small contingents for integrated operations
in Africa.
In Kosovo in 1999, air power was the weapon of choice for not
only the United States but also for European participants. Yet unlike
USAF doctrine, a fragile political environment has resulted in
a gradualist Continental European approach to the use of air
power—demonstrated in Allied Force. Continental Europeans are
reluctant to get involved in “shock and awe” air campaigns, given
the casualty sensitivity in the context of wars of choice. Germany
and Sweden—with their particular but different legacies—prefer
stabilisation operations, where air power is used in an integrated
mode and plays a rather ancillary role. In fact, a transatlantic division
of labour was apparent. While European nations provided
the bulk of ground forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, Americans provided
most of the assets for air operations. For instance, the
Clinton administration steadfastly refused to commit ground
forces to UNPROFOR in Bosnia, but the United States was the key
player in Deny Flight and Deliberate Force. 8 France has often embedded
air power into integrated operations. In 1995 the French
military promoted the presence of a heavy ground component in
Bosnia that could be used in conjunction with the air strikes.
Sweden also puts a premium upon integrated operations. The NBG
Gripen detachment is primarily geared up for the joint battle. This
emphasis upon jointness partly explains why European air forces
do not receive the same priority in the overall defence structure as
American air power does. In contrast, the USAF considers the independent
long-range strike role as one of its raisons d’être.
Yet, growing involvement in out-of-area operation can cause
increased expenditure on air power. In the case of Germany, the
A400M programme together with the Eurofighter is about to consume
a significant share of the defence equipment budget. Deployed
operations in general have had far-reaching implications
for procurement, serving as a major catalyst in force protection,