The Quest for Relevant Air Power

204 │ GERMAN Air Force
classical sense. Nevertheless, the White Paper 2006 affirmed the
GAF’s ongoing transformation.
In line with the realignment of Germany’s defence policy and
due to financial constraints, the GAF has undergone a continuous
force transformation and significant force reductions. For instance,
flying wings were reduced from 18 to seven and might
drop even lower. Yet at the same time, new capabilities and assets
have been or are planned to be acquired such as an autonomous
air operations planning capacity, HALE and MALE RPA systems,
a precision strike capability, strategic air mobility, AAR, deployable
air command and control units, or a TBMD capability. With
regard to intertheatre airlift, the GAF is about to emerge as an
important European player, as Germany placed a significant order
for A400M transport aircraft. Moreover, it has retained specific
niche capabilities such as SEAD, which provide leverage against
the backdrop of alliance operations, as was the case in the course
of Operation Allied Force. The GAF released slightly less than a
third of all HARM missiles employed.
In the field of alliance policy, it has always been a core interest
of German policy to balance American and European—primarily
French—interests. Consistent with this policy, the GAF has played
a bridging function between the FAF and the American armed
forces, be it through training establishments in the United States
or through ventures such as setting up the European Air Transport
Command with France. Germany’s deep embedding into alliance
structures also required the GAF to make meaningful contributions
to cooperative ventures in the field of rapid force
deployments such as the NRF or the EU Air RRC. Yet, these will
require a further balancing between the shaft and the spear. Moreover,
from a political point of view, a dilemma between Germany’s
strong emphasis upon the transatlantic partnership as the bedrock
for German security and the country’s reluctance to employ
military force across the spectrum of military force, a prerequisite
when closely operating with American forces, is likely to persist. It
is to be seen whether the GAF’s new operational potential will be
translated into effective operational output.
In line with Germany’s alliance policy, defence programmes
cannot solely be judged in terms of value for money. From a German
point of view, a multilateral defence programme is not only a